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HANDGUN PROHIBITION AND THE 
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 
Don B. Kates, Jr. * 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal or state handgun prohibition legislation1 is often sug-
gested as one way to reduce the incidence of homicide and other 
violent crime in the United States.2 Whatever the criminological 
merits of this suggestion,3 constitutionally speaking it raises a diverse 
set of issues. Among those which this Article will not cover in any 
depth are: 
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Sutro, San Francisco), and Mr. David Hardy (Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Interior Department, 
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1. Such legislation could, for example, take the form of a restrictive permit requirement 
designed and administered to exclude more than 99% of the civilian population from handgun 
ownership. On the constitutionality of restrictive permit systems, see notes 253-54 infra and 
accompanying text. 
2. See J. ALVIANI & W. DRAKE, HANDGUN CONTROL: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 48-54 
(U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1975) (quoting resolutions to that effect from: The Board of 
Church and Society, United Methodist Church, Co=on Cause, National Alliance for Safer 
Cities, Union of America Hebrew Congregations and Unitarian Universalist Association). 
3. The criminological literature is as bitterly divided as anything else in this emotion-laden 
area. Studies that minimize the extent or importance of firearms crime receive severe censure 
in Zimring, Games with Guns and Statistics, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 1113. On the other hand, 
various statistical arguments purporting to show that widespread gun ownership causes vio-
lence or that severe anti-gun laws reduce it are convincingly mauled in Benenson, A Controlled 
Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L.F. 718 (1968), and in Hardy & Stompoly, Of Arms and the 
Low, 51 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 62, 79-114 (1974). 
The most complete and authoritative study to date, done by Professors J. Wright and P. 
Rossi of the Social and Demographic Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts 
under a three-year grant from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, involved a comprehensive review and 
analysis of all the various studies and relevant criminological data developed as of 1980. NA• 
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIO-
LENCE IN AMERICA (1981) [hereinafter cited as WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA]. Scrupulously neutral despite its authors' admitted anti-gun sentiments, this study 
evenhandedly rebukes champions of both sides for having been so result-oriented that most of 
the pre-1975 work in the area is simply not credible. Its abstract provides the following "bot-
tom-line" conclusions: 
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(1) whether Congress has jurisdiction under the commerce clause or 
otherwise to enact a federal handgun prohibition;4 
(2) whether such a prohibition would violate the "castle doctrine" em-
bodied in the third and fourth amendments;5 
(3) whether the constitutional privacy protections of the fourth and 
fifth amendments would inhibit enforcement of such a ban;6 and 
(4) whether handgun confiscation would trigger the fifth amendment's 
just compensation requirement.7 
The constitutional issue that comes most immediately to mind in 
There appear to be no strong causal connections between private gun ownership and 
the crime rate. . . . There is no compelling evidence that private weaponry is an impor-
tant cause of, or a deterrent to, violent criminality. 
It is commonly hypothesized that much criminal violence, especially homicide, occurs 
simply because the means oflethal violence (firearms) are readily at hand, and thus, that 
much homicide would not occur were firearms generally less available. There is no per-
suasive evidence that supports this view. 
Id at 1-2. 
4. Clearly, the commerce power provides Congress jurisdiction to prohibit the continued 
importation of firearms, their domestic manufacture for interstate sale or their sale after travel 
in interstate commerce. In theory, the extension of commerce clause jurisdiction to the confis-
cation of handguns which might have been purchased by the present owner or his family 25 or 
more years ago would be questionable. But see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 
(1977) (indicating that the commerce power extends to prohibiting possession of any firearm 
which has at any time traveled in interstate or foreign commerce). Since a substantial minority 
of firearms are foreign imports, and the rest are manufactured by a few firms located in the 
New England states, most, if not all, firearms would have the required "minimal nexus" of 
having crossed a state or federal border at some time. Moreover, existing precedents at least 
arguably extend the commerce power to confiscation of even those firearms which have never 
crossed a state or federal border on the ground that the metals and other materials out of 
which they are fabricated have so moved. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964). 
5. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Supreme Court barred legislation 
prohibiting the home possession of pornography. The implications of that holding have be-
come increasingly ambiguous, as it has been honored more in the breach than in the obser-
vance. Cf. Leary v. United States, 544 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977) (no federal right of 
privacy preempts legislative prohibition of home possession of marijuana). Stanley has been 
described as no more than "a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'" Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973). Yet if Stanley has any vitality at all it surely 
encompasses the right to equip one's "castle" with firearms, locks, metal grilles and other de-
vices specifically designed to protect its privacy. However the Stanley castle doctrine may be 
narrowed, it would be difficult logically to exclude from it the home possession of firearms 
since the doctrine that "a man's home is his castle" originated in cases upholding the right to 
possess and use arms for home defense. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 
194, 195 (K.B. 1603) (quoted with approval in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596 n.44 
(1980)); Dhutti's Case, Northumberland Assize Rolls (1255) (88 Publications of Surtees Soci-
ety 94 (1891)) (household servant privileged to kill nocturnal intruder); Rex v. Compton, 22 
Liber Assisarum pL 55 (1347) (homicide of burglar is no less justifiable than that of criminal 
who resists arrest under warrant); Anonymous 1353, 26 Liber Assisarum (Edw. Ill), pl. 23 
(householder privileged to kill arsonist). 
6. See Hardy & Chotiner, The Potentiality far Civil Liberties Violations in the Enforcement 
of Handgun Prohibition' in REsTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT (D. 
Kates ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as REsTRICTING HANDGUNS]; Kessler, Enforcement Problems 
of Gun Control· A Victimless Crimes Analysis, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 131 (1980). 
1. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). But cf. Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272 (1928) (no duty to compensate if one class of property is destroyed rather than 
taken for public use). 
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connection with handgun prohibition-confiscation, however, is the 
second amendment's injunction: 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 8 
The meaning of this language has been extensively debated in light 
of what has aptly been termed "The Great American Gun War."9 
Predictably, but unfortunately, the discussion has mirrored the 
terms, conditions and bitterness of that "war." Debate has been 
sharply polarized between those who claim that the amendment 
guarantees nothing to individuals, protects only the state's right to 
maintain organized military units, and thus poses no obstacle to gun 
control (the "exclusively state's right" view), and those who claim 
that the amendment guarantees some sort of individual right to arms 
(the "individual right" view). 
The individual right view is endorsed by only a minority of legal 
scholars,10 but accepted by a majority of the general populace who, 
though supporting the idea of controlling guns, increasingly oppose 
their prohibition, believing that law-abiding citizens may properly 
have them for self-defense.11 Though the individual right view reigns 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
9. See Bruce-Briggs' article with that title in PuBuc INTEREST 37 (1976). 
10. See, e.g., Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORD-
HAM URB. L. J. 31 (1976); Dowlut, The Right to Arms: .Does the Conslilutio11 or the Predilection 
of Judges Reign?, 36 OK.LA. L. REv. 65 (1983); Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look al the 
Righi to Keep and Bear Arms, IO N. KY. L. REv. 63 (1982); Hardy & Stompoly, supra note 3; 
Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARYL. REV, 
381 (1960); Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A. J. 554 (1965). Based upon special re-
search by its staff in the archives of the Library of Congress, the Subcommittee on the Consti-
tution of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee has also endorsed the individual right view. 
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 
2D SESS., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as 
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION]. Dr. Joyce Malcolm, an historian 
whose study in England of the antecedent English legal principles was funded by the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, Harvard Law School and the National Endowment for the Humanities, 
has also accepted the individual right view. Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear 
Arms: The Common Low Tradition, 10 liAsTINGS CONST. L. Q. 285 (1983) (in press), reprinted 
in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY (D. Kates ed., forthcoming 1984) [here-
inafter cited as FIREARMS & VIOLENCE] 
Though not necessarily agreeing with all of their conclusions, this Article relies heavily 
upon the research and insights that appear in Malcolm, Caplan and the REPORT OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, and Halbrook, The Second Amendment as a 
Phenomenon of Classical Political Philosophy, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE,supra. The following 
unpublished materials have also been extremely useful: C. Asbury, The Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms in America: The Origins and Application of the Second Amendment to the Consti-
tution (1974) (unpublished doctoral thesis in history, U. of Michigan) (available at U. of Mich-
igan Graduate Library); A. Lugo Janer, The System of Defense in the Massachusetts Bay 
Colonies from 1630 to 1650 (1982) (graduate paper, U. of Pa. Law School); A. Lugo Janer, A 
Thesis on the Second Amendment (1982) (masters thesis, U. of Pa. Law School); J. Smith, The 
Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1959) (thesis, Harvard Law School). 
11. In answer to a 1975 national poll asking whether the second amendment "applies to 
each individual citizen or only to the National Guard," 70% of the respondents endorsed the 
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among nonlegal scholars, 12 the exclusively state's right position is 
dominant among lawyers and law professors13 and enjoys the sup-
port of the American Bar Association.14 That bastion of individual 
rights, the American Civil Liberties Union - a member organiza-
tion of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns- emphatically de-
nies that the second amendment has anything to do with 
individuals.15 
individual right alternative, with another 3% saying it applied to both. 121 Cong. Rec. 42, 112 
(1975). A 1978 national poll which asked, "Do you believe the Constitution of the United 
States gives you the right to keep and bear arms?" received an 87% affirmative response. Deci-
sion Making Information, Attitudes of the American Electorate Toward Gun Control (1978) 
(Mimeo). 
At the same time, national polls generally show widespread public support for the concept 
of "gun control" But since there are presently more than 20,000 federal, state and local "gun 
control" laws, the relevant inquiry is: What specific kinds of present or proposed "gun con-
trols" does the public endorse? Polls seeking opinion on specific proposals suggest that the 
public approves replacement of the present hodgepodge of diverse federal, state and local con-
trols by a national system. This system would be at once substantially less onerous than those 
presently in effect in the most restrictive jurisdictions and yet substantially more onerous than 
those of the least restrictive jurisdictions. Registration would be required for all guns (not just 
handguns) and lawful ownership would be dependent upon qualification for a permit. On the 
other hand, permits would be automatically available as a matter of right to every responsible 
law-abiding adult. See Bordua, Gun Control and Opinion Measurement: Adversary Polling and 
the Construction of Social Meaning, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note IO; Kates, Toward a 
History of Handgun Prohibition in the United Stales, in REs,RlCTING HANDGUNS, supra note 
6, at 27-30; Tonso, Social Problems and Sagecreft in the Debate over Gun Control, 5 LAW & 
POLY. Q. 325 (1983); Wright, Public Opinion and Gun Control· A Comparison of Results From 
Two Recent National Surveys, 455 ANNALS 24 (1981); if. Part IV-C infra (on the constitution-
ality of such a system). 
12. See, e.g., REPoRT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note IO; J. 
MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE Loss OF THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMs IN REsTORATION ENGLAND 
(1980); Halbrook, supra note 10; Marina, Weapons, Technology and Legitimacy: The Second 
Amendment in Global Perspective, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note IO; Shalhope, The 
Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST 599 (1982); Whisker, Historical 
Development and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 
171 (1975); C. Asbury, supra note 10. But see Shalhope, supra, at 599-600 (citations to several 
historians who embrace the exclusively state's right view). 
13. "For some years, the second amendment has been regarded by the great majority of 
constitutional scholars as irrelevant to the issue of gun control." Kaplan, Foreword, in FIRE-
ARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note 10; see, e.g., G. NEWTON & F. ZlMRlNG, FIREARMS AND VIO-
LENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE I 13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as G. NEWTON & F. ZlMRING]; Feller 
& Gotting, The Second Amendment, A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 46 (1966); Jackson, 
Handgun Control· Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 867 (1977); 
Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 Cm.-KENT L. 
REv. 148 (1971); Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms, 16 CATH. U. L. REv. 53 (1966); Weatherup, 
Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1972); Note, Right lo Keep and Bear Arms, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 423 
(1977). · 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266 n.6 (1978), considers these views so 
clearly established that he echoes them without admitting even the possiblity of any alternative 
interpretation. 
14. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, POLICY BOOK (August 1975). 
15. The ACLU's Summary of its national board's action at the June 14-15, 1980 meeting 
sets out the following policy declaration: 
The setting in which the Second Amendment was proposed and adopted demonstrates 
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Indeed, ''The Great American Gun War" bristles with ironies 
that tum our stereotypes of liberalism and conservatism topsy-turvy: 
While the New York Times editorializes that "[t]he urban handgun 
offers no benefits,"16 its publisher is among the few privileged to pos-
sess a New York City permit to carry one at all times. 17 Arch-con-
servatives who passionately denounce marijuana and homosexuality 
wax eloquent against the "victimless criminalization" of gun own-
that the right to bear arms is a collective one existing only in the collective population of 
each state for the purpose of maintaining an effective state militia. 
The ACLU agrees with the Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of the Second 
Amendment that the individual's right to bear arms applies only to the preservation of 
efficiency of a well regulated militia. Except for lawful police and military purposes, the 
possession of weapons by individuals is not constitutionally protected. Therefore there is 
no constitutional impediment to the regulation of firearms. 
Nor does the ACLU believe that there is a significant civil liberties value, apart from the 
Second Amendment, in an individual right to own or use firearms. Interests of privacy 
and self expression may be involved in any individual's choice of activities or possessions, 
but these interests are attenuated when the activity, or the object sought to be possessed, is 
inherently dangerous to others. With respect to firearms, the ACLU believes that this 
quality of dangerousness justifies legal regulation which substantially restricts the individ-
ual's interest in freedom of choice. 
At the same meeting the board approved the following clarification: "It is the sense of this 
body that the word '.justifies' in the policy means we will affirmatively support gun control 
legislation." 
16. 'I7te Real Politics of Guns, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1983, at A30, col. l; see also Taming the 
White Panthers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1983, at A30, col. 1 (in response to the assertion that 
handgun prohibition would discriminate against the poor who have less access to police pro-
tection, the editorial claims that "most civilians, whatever their income level, are likely to lack 
the training and alertness" required to "us(e] a gun to stop an armed criminal") (emphasis 
added);see n.17 infra and accompanying text. 
17. Although such permits are officially available only on a showing of "unique need" to 
carry a defensive weapon, the list of permit holders is composed of people noted more for tJieir 
political influence, wealth and social prominence than for their residence in high-crime areas, 
Along with Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the list has included such other well-known gun prohibi-
tion advocates as Nelson Rockefeller and John Lindsay. Psychologist Joyce Brothers, whose 
public position is that men possess handguns in order to compensate for sexual dysfunction, 
was not on the list. Her husband was. Kates, Some Comparisons Between The Prohibition of 
Alcohol and the Banning of Handguns, at n.21 & accompanying text (paper delivered to the 
1981 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology), revised & reprinted as Handgun 
Banning in Light of the Prohibition Experience, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note 10. 
Of course, contrary to the suggestions of the gun organizations which ferreted it out, this 
information does not per se demonstrate the invalidity of handgun prohibition-confiscation 
legislation - any more than the fact that the children of the influencial parents often manage 
to avoid the consequences of their peccadilloes demonstrates the undesirability of having crim-
inal laws, or the fact that the rich are best iible to take advantage of tax ~reaks demonstrates 
the invalidity thereof. If we were to repeal every law or governmental program - however 
beneficial to society generally - from which the rich and the influential are in a position to 
obtain special benefits, or to avoid the most onerous effects, there would be neither government 
nor laws. 
But such anomalies are particularly detrimental to the enforceability of handgun prohibi-
tion-confiscation. How can the resident of a high-crime area be convinced to give up what he 
believes to be his family's only real security when people who live and work in high-security 
buildings in the best-policed areas of the city are privileged not to do so? How can he be 
dissuaded from thinking that guns give security when many of those who have so derisively 
assailed that idea tum out to mean only that handguns are useless to those who lack the special 
influence necessary to secure a permit? 
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ers.18 The National Rifle Association (NRA) has its own gun control 
program, involving mandatory minimum prison sentences for the 
use of a gun in the commission of a crime - a scheme which the 
NRA's opponents decry.19 But these same opponents endorse 
mandatory minimum prison sentences for people who (without mis-
use) simply carry a handgun illegally -people who tum out over-
whelmingly to be not criminals but frightened shopkeepers, 
secretaries and the elderly - respectable citizens who must live or 
work in high-crime areas but lack the political influence necessary to 
get a permit.20 Normally antipathetic political extremists of virtually 
every persuasion join with apolitical gun collectors in paranoid vi-
sions of gun bans as persecutions directed especially against them.21 
Usually liberal jurists and newspaper columnists frankly call for ab-
rogation of the fourth amendment insofar as it would hinder police 
confiscation of guns - "unlimited search and seizure" against any-
one suspected of being a handgun owner.22 
Equally ironic, the legal community's endorsement of the exclu-
sively state's right interpretation has actually aided the gun organiza-
tions in one way. By concentrating attention on the state's right 
position, the gun-owner organizations have been able to avoid the 
details of their own individual right position, which seems inconsis-
tent with the kinds of gun controls the organizations have themselves 
endorsed.23 In almost every state, the basic handgun legislation, in-
18. Examples could be multiplied almost endlessly, but among the more prominent are 
Rep. John Ashbrook (R-Ohio), who was, until his death in 1982, a member of the NRA na-
tional board, and California State Sen. H.L. Richardson, who is both an NRA board member 
and the founder and head of Gun Owners of America. • 
19. See, e.g., M. YEAGER, Do MANDATORY PRISON SENTENCES FOR HANDGUN OFFEND-
ERS CURB VIOLENT CRIME (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1976). Criticism of this NRA gun 
control alternative is not, however, limited to professional anti-gun analysts. See Kates, Why 
Gun Control Won't Work, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 13, 1981, at 136; Loftin & McDowall, One with 
a Gun Gets You 1wo, 455 ANNALS 150 (1981). 
20. See Kates,supra note 19, at I36;seealfo Kates,supra note 17, at n.16 & accompanying 
text (unpaginated manuscript). · 
21. See, e.g., G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, supra note 13, at 195 app. F (statements of vari-
ous extremist political groups); Marwick, Whal Gun Co/lee/ors and Political Activists Have in 
Common, FIRST PRINCIPLES, June 1979. For historical examples of the use of gun confisca-
tions to persecute political enemies, see notes 136-40 infra and accompanying text. Others are 
collected in Kessler, Gun Control and Political Power, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 381 (1983). 
22. See Wilkey, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1977, at 12, col. 4; Keegan, U.S.A., "Nation of Hy-
pocrites" on Enforcement of Gun Laws, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 2. See gener-
ally Hardy & Chotiner, supra note 6. 
23. Notwithstanding their portrayal in the news media (and indeed, their own self-por-
traits), gun-owner organizations are not necessarily against gun control, as opposed to gun 
prohibition-confiscation. While they frequently cite the failure of our present 20,000 gun con-
trol measures as evidence of the uselessness of a gun ban, they fail to point out that they and 
their predecessors are responsible for many of those controls. In addition to the controls de-
rived from the Uniform Revolver Act, see notes 24-26 infta and accompanying text, the NRA 
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eluding both the prohibition on the carrying of concealed weapons 
and the restrictions on gun ownership by felons, minors, and incom-
petents, 24 stems from the Uniform Revolver Act,25 drafted and pro-
moted by the NRA and the now defunct United States Revolver 
Association in the first three decades of this century.26 However so-
cially desirable these and other controls may be, they raise problems 
for the individual right interpretation which its proponents have 
rarely, if ever, attempted to address. For example: 
(1) Since the amendment contains no express limitation on the kind of 
"arms" guaranteed, why does it only protect possession of ordinary 
small arms (rifles, shotguns, handguns)? Why not of artillery, flame-
throwers, machine guns, and so on, to the prohibition of which gun-
owner groups have readily acceded? 
(2) Likewise, since the amendment's guarantee does not explicitly 
limit gun ownership to responsible adults, why does it not proscribe the 
laws restricting handgun ownership by lunatics, criminals and 
juveniles? 
(3) Since the amendment guarantees an (apparently unqualified) right 
to "bear" as well as to ''keep" arms, how can individual right propo-
nents endorse concealed-carry proscriptions? 
(4) Conversely, if all these controls are consistent with the gun-owner 
groups' position, how can they contend that registration and licensing 
requirements are not?27 
In short, even if the historical evidence does establish an individ-
ual right to arms, it remains to define its parameters, particularly 
with regard to gun control rather than gun prohibition-confisca-
tion.28 One of the purposes of this Article will be to sketch out at 
also cooperated in enacting the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, 52 
Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968). L. KENNETI & J. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA 211 
(1975). Although the NRA did not affirmatively support the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1976), the American firearms industry supported it for economic reasons. 
Kates, Towards a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, in RESTRICTING HAND· 
GUNS, supra note 6, at 25. Nevertheless, the NRA has sought only certain civil liberty modifi-
cations to the Act. For example, the Firearm Owners Protection Act, S. 1914, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 3872-74 (1983), introduced by Senator McClure (R-Idaho), seeks to 
amend the Act by prohibiting warrantless searches and other alleged abuses without repealing 
the provisions designed to forbid firearms to violent felons, juveniles and the mentally 
unstable. 
24. See note 265 & 268 infra and accompanying text. 
25. A Bill To Provide For UnffeJrm Regulation of Revolver Sales (The United States Re-
volver Association), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS· 
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL 
MEETING 728 (1924) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. 
26. See L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at ch. 8; United States Revolver Asso-
ciation, The Argument far a UnffeJrm Revolver Act, in HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 716; Report 
of the Committee on a UnffeJrm Act to Regulate the Sale and Possession of Firearms, in HAND• 
BOOK,.SUpra note 25, at 711. 
27. These and other issues relating to the constitutionality of specific gun control options 
are treated in detail in Part IV. See notes 235-71 infra and accompanying text. 
28. This Article does not purport to resolve, or even to address, the current debate among 
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least some of the very substantial limitations on the right of individ-
uals to keep and bear arms suggested by the historical evidence. 29 
First, however, the controversy between the individual right and the 
exclusively state's right views must be resolved. The evidence to be 
examined must include: the literal language of the second amend-
ment; the history of its proposal and ratification; the philosophical 
and historical background that gave rise to the Founders' belief in 
"the necessity of an armed populace to effect popular sovereignty";30 
and the contemporary understanding of the second amendment. 
This Article will then consider the amendment's subsequent judicial 
interpretation, and the question of its incorporation against the 
states, before returning to constitutional limitations on the right to 
keep and bear arms. 
I. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 
The two opposing camps naturally rely on different interpreta-
tions of the origins of the second amendment. Proponents of the 
exclusively state's right view31 see the amendment as responding to 
constitutional scholars over the proper role of original intent in constitutional adjudication. As 
to that debate, see, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (evaluating interpretive 
and fundamental value approaches and arguing for his own form of ''ultimate interpretivism"; 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971) (arguing 
that neutral deri1<ation of principle requires adherence to original intent); Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980) (arguing that interpre-
tivism is impossible and does not serve the ends of constitutionalism); Monaghan, Our Perfect 
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981) (original intent is proper interpretive mode for 
ascertaining constitutional meaning). For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note 
that courts and commentators continue to refer to the text and the intent behind it, taking as 
their guides the writings of Madison, Jefferson and the other Framers, and the historical back-
ground in colonial and English law of the provision under consideration. See, e.g., Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). Even 
Thomas Grey, who would read the Constitution in light of modem values, justifies his inter-
pretation on the ground that this was the Framers' intent. Grey, .Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 715-17 (1975). 
29. See notes 235-71 infra and accompanying text. 
30. Halbrook, supra note 10, at n. 79 & accompanying text (unpaginated manuscript). 
31. What is here denominated the "exclusively state's right" position is sometimes also 
described as the "collective right" theory. That phrase is not used here because of the potential 
for confusion with a related, but occasionally discretely stated, "collective right" theory. This 
second "collective right" theory was first enunciated by the Kansas Supreme Court in a deci-
sion which eviscerated the right to arms provision of that state's constitution. Salina v. Blak-
sely, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 61 (1905). Under this theory constitutional right to arms guarantees, 
whether federal or state, involve only a "collective right" of the entire people, by which is 
apparently meant a right that cannot be invoked by anyone either in his own behalf or on 
behalf of the people as a whole. 
It will be unnecessary to consider at length this discrete "collective right" theory because it 
is patently wrong. If the amendment was intended to guarantee a right to the people (and not 
the states), it is self-contradictory to say that because that right was conferred on everyone, no 
single person may assert it, or indeed, to describe something that guarantees nothing to any 
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article I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16, of the original Constitution. 
Those clauses give Congress the power to call out the militia and "to 
provide for organizing, arming and disciplining" it. According to 
the state's right interpretation, the amendment was motivated by fear 
that Congress might order the states' organized militias disarmed, 
thereby leaving the states powerless against federal tyranny. Thus, 
this view sees the amendment as a response to concerns that time 
and the course of American history have rendered anachronistic. 
During the Revolution, and the subsequent period of the Articles of 
Confederation, the states loomed larger than the federal government 
and jealously guarded their prerogatives against it. While the Consti-
tution itself heralded a decisive (though limited) repudiation of those 
attitudes, they remained strong enough to assure two precatory ad-
monitions a place in the Bill of Rights. These became the second 
and tenth amendments. The purpose of the second amendment was 
simply to place the states' organized military forces beyond the fed-
eral government's power to disarm, guaranteeing that the states 
would always have sufficient force at their command to nullify fed-
eral impositions on their rights and to resist by arms if necessary.32 
State's right proponents also link the amendment to the traditional 
Whig fear of standing armies. Though the federal government could 
not be denied authority to maintain a small army, the basic military 
defense of the country would rest in the states' reserved power to 
maintain their own organized military forces. These could be joined 
together to resist foreign invasion in time of need. Thus, the philoso-
phy underlying the second amendment not only guaranteed the 
states' right to keep armed forces, but obviated any need for a mas-
sive federal military which might defeat them if they found it neces-
sary to revolt.33 
This state's right analysis renders the amendment little more than 
a holdover from an era of constitutional philosophy that received its 
death knell in the decision rendered at Appomattox Courthouse. 
Though it yet lingers in the Constitution, it does not (for it was never 
specific person or entity as a "right" at all. Thus, the discrete "collective right" theory fails to 
meet Chief Justice Marshall's elementary test for constitutional construction: "It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect .... " Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); cf. Hardy & Stompoly, supra note 3, at 74-75 (state 
provisions meaningless if right to keep and bear arms refers only to right of state to form a 
militia); REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITIEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 11 (individ-
ual rights interpretation gives full meaning to the words chosen by the First Congress to reflect 
the right to keep and bear arms). 
32. See generally the sources cited at notes 13-15 supra. The historical accuracy of this 
view of the amendment is analyzed at notes 86-89 infra and accompanying text. 
33. See notes 86-89 & 113 infra and accompanying text. 
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so intended) guarantee the right of any individual against confisca-
tion of arms. Rather, it guarantees an exclusive right of the states, 
which only the states have standing to invoke. This they need not do 
today when any value the amendment might presently have for them 
is satisfied by their federally-provided National Guard structure. 
Advocates of the individual right position, on the other hand, 
rely on the fact that the natural reading of the amendment's phrase 
"right of the people" is that it creates not a state right, but one which 
individuals can assert. This is how the identically phrased34 first and 
fourth amendments are interpreted.35 Furthermore, the individual 
right advocate may accept the state's right theory and simply assert 
that, even though one of the amendment's purposes may have been 
to protect the states' militias,36 another was to protect the individual 
right to arms. Indeed, the evidence suggests it was precisely by pro-
tecting the individual that the Framers intended to protect the mili-
tia.37 In thus yielding to the primary strength of the opposing 
argument, individual right advocates define the burden that the ex-
clusively state's right theorist must bear. To demonstrate that no in-
dividual right was intended, he must show not just that there was a 
desire to protect the states, but that there was no desire to protect 
individuals - despite the most natural reading of the amendment's 
phraseology. As we shall see, this is a particularly difficult burden to 
bear. Such debate as the amendment received is sparse and incon-
clusive, while other legislative history strongly supports the proposi-
tion that protection of an individual right was at least one of the 
amendment's purposes.38 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects . . . ."). 
35. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980) (right to 
assemble peacefully is as fundamental as free press and speech and exists as an independent 
right as well as a catalyst for the exercise of other first amendment rights); United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) (defendants charged with crimes of possession may claim 
benefits of the exclusionary rule to vindicate their fourth amendment rights). 
36. For the specialized 18th century usage of "militia" to encompass the entire military-age 
male population, see notes 39-55 i,!fra and accompanying text. 
37. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
38. The recorded debate, which centered on a tangential issue, is discussed at note 90 infra. 
Other direct legislative history is set out at notes 75-89 i,!fra and accompanying text. The 
philosophical underpinning of the amendment is set out at notes 90-134 i,!fra and accompany-
ing text. Much of this material derives from unpublished background studies by Professor 
Halbrook which, along with some additional material, are embodied in his article To Keep and 
Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1797, 10 N. KY. L. 
REv. 13 (1982). 
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A. Parsing the Language of the Second Amendment and the Bill of 
Rights 
In general, the text of the second amendment, and of the Bill of 
Rights as a whole, provides a series of insuperable obstacles to an 
exclusively state's right interpretation. State's right analyses have 
tended not to come to grips with these obstacles; if they focus on the 
amendment's wording at all, it is only on the word "militia," assum-
ing that the Framers meant "militia" to refer to "a particular mili-
tary force," i.e., the states' home reserve, now federalized as the 
National Guard.39 In fact, though not unknown in the 18th Cen-
tury,40 that usage was wholly secondary to the one Webster classifies 
as now least used. "The whole body of able-bodied male citizens 
declared by law as being subject to call to military service."41 As the 
paragraphs below demonstrate, the Framers' understanding of the 
meaning of "militia" and the other phrases of the second amend-
ment seriously embarrasses the state's right argument. 
1. The Militia 
Throughout their existence, the American colonies had endured 
the constant threat of sudden attack by Indians or any of Britain's 
Dutch, French and Spanish colonial rivals.42 Even if they had 
wanted a standing army, the colonists were unable either to afford 
the cost or to free up the necessary manpower. Instead, they adopted 
the ancient practice that was still in vogue in England, the militia 
system. The "militia" was the entire adult male citizenry, who were 
not simply allowed to keep their own arms, but affirmatively required 
to do so. In the pre-colonial English tradition there had been no 
police and no standing army in peacetime.43 From time immemo-
rial every free Englishman had been both permitted and required to 
keep such arms as a person of his class could afford both for law 
enforcement and for military service.44 With arms readily available 
39. See, e.g., sources cited in note 13 supra. 
40. WEBSTER'S Tu!RD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971). 
41. Id 
42. See Dowlut, supra note 10, at 69. (Dowlut also mentions that the colonists were ex-
posed to general crime against which they both armed themselves individually and acted 
jointly in the posse comitatus .). 
43. When a large scale threat, such as invasion, presented itself, the civilian militia was 
mobilized for military duty. In addition, civilian subjects participated in ordinary police work, 
both individually and as members of posses. Id at 93. 
44. C. GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROL: A STUDY OF ARMED CRIME AND FIREARMS 
CONTROL IN ENGLAND AND WALES 7 (1972); C. HOLLISTER, ANGLO-SAXON MILITARY INSTI· 
TUTIONS ch. 2 (1962). As weapons improved or new technologies, including firearms, took 
their place, successive monarchs and parliaments constantly found it necessary to redefine and 
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in their homes, Englishmen were theoretically prepared at all times 
to chase down felons in response to the hue and cry, or to assemble 
together as an impromptu army in case of foreign invasion of their 
shire.45 
When the American colonies were founded the militia system 
was in full flower in England. It was adopted perforce in the colo-
nies, which were thousands of miles by sail from any succor the 
Mother Country might provide. With slight variations, the different 
colonies imposed a duty to keep arms and to muster occasionally for 
drill upon virtually every able-bodied white man between the age of 
majority and a designated cut-off age. Moreover, the duty to keep 
arms applied to every household, not just to those containing persons 
subject to militia service.46 Thus, the over-aged and seamen, who 
were exempt from militia service, were required to keep arms for law 
enforcement and for the defense of their homes from criminals or 
foreign enemies.47 In at least one colony a 1770 law actually required 
reemphasize citizens' continuing obligation to arm themselves with the most effectual weapons 
they could afford. For the legislation of Mary Tudor and Elizabeth I, see A. Lugo Janer, supra 
note 10, at 6-13. Legislation enacted by their father, Henry VIII, is discussed at note 235 infra 
and accompanying text. For the tergiversatous course followed by their Stuart successors, see 
notes 136-39 infra and accompanying text. 
45. F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 276 (Fisher ed. 1961), 
particularly stresses the joinder of military and law enforcement purposes served by the re-
quirement that every free man possess weapons. See also Malcolm, supra note IO; J. Smith, 
supra note 10, at 6; note 44 supra. 
46. From the earliest times the duty to possess arms was imposed on the entire colonial 
populace, with actual militia service contemplated for every male of 15, 16, or 18 through 45, 
50, or 60 (depending on the colony). As noted in the REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note IO, at 3 (footnotes omitted): 
In the colonies, availability of hunting and need for defense led to armament statutes 
comparable to those of the early Saxon times. In 1623, Virginia forbade its colonists to 
travel unless they were ''well armed"; in 1631 it required colonists to engage in target 
practice on Sunday and to "bring their peeces [sic] to Church." In 1658 it required every 
householder to have a functioning firearm within his house and in 1673 its laws provided 
that a citizen who claimed he was too poor to purchase a firearm would have one 
purchased for him by the government, which would then require him to pay a reasonable 
price when able to do so. In Massachusetts, the first session of the legislature ordered that 
not only free men, but also indentured servants own firearms and in 1644 it imposed a 
stem 6 shilling fine upon any citizen who was not armed. 
For examples of subsequent legislation to the same effect, see An Act for Regulating the Mili-
tia, 1741, reprinted in 8 COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT 379 (1874); Act for Regulating 
the Militia, 1693-1694, 1st sess., ch. 3, reprinted in l ACTS AND REsOLVES OF THE PROVINCE 
OF MAsSACHUSETTS BAY 128 (1869); An Act for Settling the Militia, 1691, 1st sess., ch.5, 
reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 To THE REVOLU-
TION 231 (1894). Colonial practice is extensively summarized in United States v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 174, 179 (1939) ("[T]he term Militia [in the amendment] ... comprised all males physi-
cally capable of acting in concert for the common defense ... [who] were expected to appear 
bearing arms supplied by themselves •... "). 
47. See, e.g., THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MAsSACHUSETTS 42 (M. Farrard ed. 1929, re-
printed from the 1648 ed.) ("But all persons exempted whatsoever as foresaid, except Magis-
trates and Teaching Elders shall be provided of Arms and Ammunition, as other men are."); 
see also Dowlut, supra note 10, at 74 n.37 (quoting similar provisions of various New York 
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men to carry a rifle or pistol every time they attended church; church 
officials were empowered to search each parishioner no less than 
fourteen times per year to assure compliance.48 In 1792 Congress, 
meeting immediately after the enactment of the second amendment, 
defined the militia to include the entire able-bodied military-age 
male citizenry of the United States and required each of them to own 
his own firearm.49 
What does this suggest about the word "militia" as used in the 
amendment? The American Civil Liberties Union's argument 
against an individual right interpretation states that the amendment 
uses "militia" in the sense of a formal military force separate from 
the people.50 But this is plainly wrong. The Founders stated what 
they meant by "militia" on various occasions. Invariably they de-
fined it in some phrase like "the whole body of the people,"51 while 
their references to the organized-military-unit usage of militia, which 
they called a "select militia," were strongly pejorative.52 
and Virginia statutes). As in England, the requirement of keeping arms was as much directed 
toward prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals as the repelling of foreign enemies. 
Militiamen (apparently selected by rotation) staffed the night watch which both patrolled the 
city and watched out over it from stationary positions to raise the hue and cry in case of felony 
and the alarm in case of foreign attack. A. Lugo Janer, supra note IO, at 33-34. 
48. An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants by Obliging the Male White Persons 
to Carry Fire Arms to Places of Public Worship, 1770, reprinted in 1775-1770 GEORGIA COLO-
NIAL LAWS 471 (1932). 
49. First Militia Act, I Stat. 271 (1792). Legislation by Congress immediately following 
adoption of an amendment is entitled to great weight in the construction thereof. See, e.g., 
Hampton & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928), and cases cited therein. 
SO. Over and above the historical inaccuracy of the ACLU's interpretation is that, so inter-
preted, the amendment conflicts with Art. I§ 10, cl. 3 which forbids the states to raise "troops" 
(i.e. formal military units) without the consent of Congress. There is not one iota of historical 
evidence suggesting that Madison and his Federalist colleagues who dominated the first Con-
gress intended the amendment to undercut either the military-militia clauses of the original 
Constitution in general or Art. I § 10, cl. 3 in particular. See notes 86-9 & 113 infra and 
accompanying discussion. 
SI. See, eg., VA. CONST. art. I, §13 (1776) ("[A] well-regulated militia, composed of the 
body of the people .•.. "); DEBATES lN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA, reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 425 (3d 
ed. 1937) (statement of George Mason, June 14, 1788) (''Who are the Militia? They consist 
now of the whole people ..•. ''); LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 
123 (JI. Bennett ed. 1978) (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee) [hereinafter cited as LETTERS 
FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER] ("[a] militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people 
themselves ...• "); Letter from Tench Coxe to the Pennsylvania Gazette (Feb. 20, 1778), re-
printed in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Mfm. 
Supp.) 1779 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (''Who are these militia? are [sic] they not ourselves.") (em-
phasis in original); see also R. TRENCH, DICTIONARY OF OBSOLETE ENGLISH 159 (1958); 
Sprecher supra note 10, at 556 n.29 (citing several other state constitutions). 
52. Typical expressions of hostility are cited by Halbrook, supra note 38, at 18-19, 23-25, 
and REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 4-5. These 
expressions reflect a traditional Whig attitude, dating back to the reign of Charles II, who was 
thought to have used the "select militia" to disarm and tyrannize the people. Malcolm, supra 
note IO. 
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In short, one purpose of the Founders having been to guarantee 
the arms of the militia, they accomplished that purpose by guaran-
teeing the arms of the individuals who made up the militia. In this 
respect it would never have occurred to the Founders to differentiate 
between the arms of the two groups in the context of the amend-
ment's language.53 The personally owned arms of the individual 
were the arms of the militia.54 Thus, the amendment's wording, so 
opaque to us, made perfect sense to the Framers: believing that a 
militia ( composed of the entire people possessed of their individually 
owned arms) was necessary for the protection of a free state, they 
53. This is not to say that the amendment's only purpose was to guarantee the arms of the 
militia. The philosophical tradition underlying the amendment involved three separate pur-
poses. Certain of the early English commentators on the right to bear arms: 
subtly blended several distinct, yet related, ideas: opposition to standing armies, depen-
dence upon militias, and support of the armed citizen. Thus, while the concept of the 
armed citizen was sometimes linked with that of the militia, libertarians just as often 
stressed this idea as an independent theme or joined it to other issues. 
The observations of Madison, Washington, Dwight, and Story reveal an interesting rela-
tionship between the armed citizen and the militia. These men firmly believed that the 
character and spirit of the republic rested on the freeman's possession of arms as well as 
his ability and willingness to defend himself and his society. This was the bedrock, the 
"palladium," of republican liberty. The militia was equally important in their minds. 
Militia laws insured that freemen would remain armed, and thus vigorous republican 
citizens. 
Shalhope, supra note 12, at 604, 612. Thus, by guaranteeing individuals the right to arms the 
amendment killed three birds with one stone. First, the independence and self reliance neces-
sary to the citizen of a republic was protected by assuring to each individual the right to pos-
sess the arms necessary to defending, and securing food for himself and his family. On the 
possession of arms as a vital component in the theory of virtuous republican citizenship, see 
notes 117-18infra and accompanying text. Second and third, by guaranteeing the arms of the 
individual, the amendment was simultaneously guaranteeing arms to the militia and the posse 
comitatus for military and law enforcement purposes. In this connection it is important to 
remember that, although these can be stated as three separate functions - and it seems natural 
to the modem mind to so conceptualize them - it would not have seemed so to the Founders. 
See note 93 infra and accompanying text. 
54. That one result of guaranteeing the people's privately owned arms was to guarantee the 
militia's arms should not, however, be understood as suggesting that the only arms protected 
were those belonging to militiamen. Among other things, the amendment surely was intended 
at least to protect those non-militia members who were obligated to possess arms, such as the 
over-aged and seamen, see note 47 supra and accompanying text. More important, a "right" to 
possess arms is obviously broader than an obligation to do so. The amendment's use of "right" 
without further definition suggests that its purpose was to constitutionalize the right to arms 
which the Founders knew from the common law. This unquestionably included not only mili-
tiamen and others obligated to possess arms, but also women, the clergy and those public 
officials who were exempt from militia service. On the other hand, it is necessary to distin-
guish those whose right the amendment was intended to protect although they were exempt 
from militia service, from those who were excluded because of perceived unfitness, untrustwor-
thiness or alienage. The Founders would not have understood the amendment as extending to 
felons, children or those so physically or mentally impaired as to preclude militia service. See 
notes 72, 267 and 258 infra. The original intention would unquestionably also have been to 
exclude Indians and blacks on the ground of alienage or untrustworthiness. For evidence that 
one purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to guarantee blacks the right to arms, see notes 
221-30 infra and accompanying text. 
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guaranteed the people's right to possess those arms.55 At the very 
least, the Framers' understanding of "militia" casts doubt on an in-
terpretation that would guarantee only the state's right to arm organ-
ized military units. 56 
2. A "Right of the People" 
The second amendment's literal language creates another, even 
more embarrassing problem for the exclusively state's right interpre-
tation. To accept such an interpretation requires the anomalous as-
sumption that the Framers ill-advisedly used the phrase "right of the 
people" to describe what was being guaranteed when what they ac-
tually meant was "right of the states."57 In tum, that assumption 
leads to a host of further anomalies. The phrase "the people" ap-
pears in four other provisions of the Bill of Rights, always denoting 
rights pertaining to individuals. Thus, to justify an exclusively 
state's right view, the following set of propositions must be accepted: 
(1) when the first Congress drafted the Bill of Rights it used "right of 
the people" in the first amendment to denote a right of individuals 
(assembly); (2) then, some sixteen words later, it used the same 
phrase in the second amendment to denote a right belonging exclu-
sively to the states; (3) but then, forty-six words later, the fourth 
amendment's "right of the people" had reverted to its normal indi-
vidual right meaning; ( 4) "right of the people" was again used in the 
natural sense in the ninth amendment; and (5) finally, in the tenth 
amendment the first Congress specifically distinguished "the states" 
from ''the people," although it had failed to do so in the second 
amendment. Any one of these textual incongruities demanded by an 
exclusively state's right position dooms it. Cumulatively they pre-
sent a truly grotesque reading of the Bill of Rights. 
55. Smith "translates" the amendment's language into modem terms as follows: 
Because a free state cannot be secure from either internal or external enemies unless every 
able-bodied [adult] in the state is trained to use weapons; the right of each individual 
person, in any of the 50 states, to keep in his house weapons sufficient for his own use, and 
to use them in such military training as is directed by his state government, shall not be 
interferred with by the United States Government. · 
J. Smith, supra note 10, at 72. Note that Smith's formulation here reflects usage in colonial 
statutes and related documents which he concludes indicates an intention to broadly guarantee 
individuals the right to "keep" arms in their homes, but to "bear" them outside the home only 
in the course of actual militia service. See notes 59-61, 2711i?fra and accompanying text. 
56. As we shall see, the joint-purpose interpretation of the second amendment inherent in 
the Framers' conception of an armed citizenry - that is, self-defense, law enforcement, and 
defense against invasion -implies certain limitations on any individual right that amendment 
may guarantee. See notes 233-71 infra and accompanying text. 
57. In constitutional or statutory construction, language should always be accorded its 
plain meaning. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816), 
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3. Keeping and Bearing Arms 
The casual attention state's right proponents pay to the text is 
exemplified by a third problem inherent in the amendment's literal 
language. Professor Levin argues that the amendment's use of the 
term "to bear'' arms supports an exclusively state's right view: con-
temporary statutory usage shows eighteenth-century writers using 
"bear" in reference to militiamen carrying their arms when mustered 
to duty; whereas Blackstone uses the phrase to ''have" arms in refer-
ring to individual possession of them by right.58 Remarkably, Pro-
fessor Levin seems to have overlooked the fact that the word that the 
amendment uses to guarantee a right to possess arms is "keep," 
"bear" being used only to denote carrying them outside the home. 
Obviously, even if a negative pregnant as to possession could have 
been inferred had the amendment used "bear arms" alone, that in-
ference disappears completely when "to keep" is added. 
Had Professor Levin explored colonial statutory usage of "to 
keep," as well as "to bear," he would have found his "to bear'' argu-
ment confirmed, but only in a way which decisively refutes his exclu-
sively state's right interpretation. Smith's extensive statutory review 
confirms that "bear'' did generally refer to the carrying of arms by 
militiamen. 59 Since statutes referring to the transportation of arms 
by individuals outside the militia context (e.g., statutes forbidding 
blacks and Indians to transport them) invariably used the word 
"carry" instead of "bear," he concludes that the amendment's use of 
"bear'' is designed to protect the carrying of arms outside the home 
only in the course of militia service.60 In contrast, Smith finds that 
"keep" was commonly used in colonial and early state statutes to 
describe arms possession by individuals in all contexts, not just in 
relation to militia service. Colonial statutes did require militiamen 
to "keep" arms in their homes, but they also required the over-aged, 
seamen and others exempt from militia service to "keep" arms in 
their homes. Moreover, what blacks and Indians (who were ex-
cluded from the militia) were forbidden to do was "keep" guns in 
their homes. The one context in which "keep" was not used was as a 
description of arms possession by public agencies (as opposed to in-
dividuals): "only occasionally, and then only in the 17th Century, 
are towns and colony governments said to 'keep' the public arms."61 
58. Levin, supra note 13, at 148. 
59. See J. Smith, supra note 10, at 42-55. 
60. Id at 42-47. The implications of this conclusion for some types of gun controls are 
discussed in the text following note 271 infra. 
61. Id at 49; see also id. at 47-55. In contrast to the "keeping" by individuals of their 
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Based on colonial statutory usage then, the amendment's phrase 
"right of the people to keep" imports not a right of the states or one 
limited to military service, but a personal right to possess arms in the 
home for any lawful purpose. 
Additional textual evidence of the unsoundness of the exclusively 
state's right position is that it renders the phrase "to keep" in "to 
keep and bear" superfluous - as Professor Levin's obliviousness to 
it unconsciously dramatizes. · If the Framers' only concern had been 
to protect the militia's right to have arms when actually mustered, 
"to bear" would have sufficed. The words "to keep" take on meaning 
only if what is being protected is the individual's own arms, rather 
than those arms of the state that would be dispensed to him from an 
armory whenever the militia was mustered. 62 
Finally, the organizational structure of the Bill of Rights cuts 
against the exclusively state's right position. The rights specifically 
guaranteed to the people are contained in the first nine amendments, 
with the rights reserved to the states being relegated to the tenth. If 
the Framers had viewed the second amendment as a right of the 
states, they would have moved it back to the ninth or tenth amend-
ment instead of placing it second. 63 
B. The Proposal and Ratification of the Second Amendment 
As we have seen, the language of the second amendment sup-
ports the individual interpretation of the right to keep and bear 
arms. The nature of the controversy over ratification of the Consti-
tution and the various proposals for and debate over the Bill of 
Rights also buttress the individual right view, for the one thing all 
private arms in their own homes, the statutes described publicly owned arms as being "lodged" 
in armories at such times as they were not actually being borne. 
62. By the same token, however, the phrase "keep and bear" implies at least one important 
limitation. Because what is being guaranteed is an individual right to keep and bear arms, the 
arms could only be such if the ordinary individual could conveniently lift and transport them 
about with his body. For the gun control implications of this observation see text at note 241 
infra. 
63. See note 77 and accompanying text. Gardiner has suggested that the organization of 
the Constitution and Bill of Rights was deliberately modeled after Blackstone's organization of 
the five legal precepts he considered fundamental to the maintenance of English liberty. See 
Gardiner, supra note 10, at 65 n.8. The correspondence can be established as follows: parlia-
mentary powers and privileges are comprehended in an. I; the limitations on the powers of the 
monarch (executive branch) are comprehended in art. II; the institution and powers of the 
courts of justice are comprehended in an. Ill; the right to apply to Parliament for redress of 
grievances is comprehended in the first amendment; and the right to possess arms is covered in 
the second amendment. If meritorious, this analysis further buttresses the individual right 
position since Blackstone included the right to arms among the "absolute rights of individu-
als." See note 153 infra. 
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the Framers agreed on was the desirability of allowing citizens to 
arm themselves. 
I. The Debate Over the Constitution 
The Founding Fathers were necessarily· influenced by the fact 
that the entire corpus of republican philosophy known to them took 
English and classical history as a lesson that popular possession of 
arms was vital to the preservation of liberty and a republican form of 
government. 64 The proponents and the opponents of ratification of 
the Constitution equally buttressed their conflicting arguments on 
the universal belief in an armed citizenry.65 The proponents denied 
that the newly strengthened federal government could ever be strong 
enough to destroy the liberties of an armed populace: "While the 
people have property, arms in their hands and only a spark of noble 
spirit, the most corrupt congress must be mad to form any project of 
tyranny."66 As Noah Webster put it in a pamphlet urging ratifica-
tion: "Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; 
as they are in almost every kingdom in Europe."67 
But this line of argument opened the Federalists up to a telling 
riposte: Since the Constitution contained no guarantee of the citi-
zenry's right to arms, the new federal government could outlaw and 
confiscate them, thereby destroying the supposed barrier to federal 
despotism. George Mason recalled to the Virginia delegates the col-
onies' experience with Britain, in which the monarch's goal had been 
"to disarm the people; that . . . was the best and most effectual way 
to enslave them."68 Together Mason and Richard Henry Lee are 
generally given preponderant credit for the compromise under which 
the Constitution was ratified subject to the understanding that it 
would immediately be augmented by a Bill of Rights. Lee's influen-
tial writing on the ratification question extolled the importance of 
the individual right to arms, opining that "to preserve liberty, it is 
64. The influence of such philosophers as Harrington, Nedham and Machiavelli is docu-
mented at notes 114-27 iefra and accompanying text. See also Granter, The Machiavellianism 
of George Mason, 17 W. & M. QUARTERLY 239 (2d ser. 1937). See generally Halbrook, supra 
note 10; Shalhope, supra note 12. For the historical origins of this philosophy, see notes 114-28 
iefra. 
65. See Part 1-C iefra. 
66. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 4-5; Hal-
brook, supra note 10, at 17 (quoting a newspaper columnist); see also id. at 24, 37. 
67. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 5. For 
Madison's similar expressions from The Federalist, see note I 00 iefra and accompanying text. 
For similar expressions pro and con, see the quotations collected by Halbrook, supra note 10. 
68. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 380 (2d ed. 1836). See 
generally Shalhope, supra note 12, at 606-13 (on the Federalist and Anti-Federalist arguments 
based on the individual right to arms). 
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essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms and 
be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them."69 
In line with these sentiments, New Hampshire, the first state to 
ratify the Constitution, officially recommended that it include a bill 
of rights providing "Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless 
such as are or have been in actual rebellion."70 New York and 
Rhode Island also recommended constitutionalizing the right to 
arms.71 Although a majority of the Pennsylvania convention ratified 
the Constitution unconditionally, rejecting suggestions that a bill of 
rights be recommended or required, a substantial portion of the 
Pennsylvania delegates broke away on this issue. As a rump they 
formulated and published a series of proposals, including freedom of 
speech, press, due process of law and the right to keep and bear 
arms, which proved particularly influential in spurring the adoption 
of similar recommendations in the subsequent state conventions. 
The individual right nature of the Pennsylvania right to arms propo-
sal is unmistakable: 
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves 
and their own State or the United States, or for the purpose of killing 
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of 
them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from 
individuals .... 72 
Similarly, Samuel Adams proposed to the Massachusetts ratification 
convention an amendment guaranteeing the right to bear arms. 73 
The strength and universality of contemporary sentiment on the 
issue of the individual's right to arms may be gauged with reference 
to the number of amendatory proposals which included it. Amend-
ing the constitution to assure the right to arms was endorsed by five 
state ratifying conventions. By comparison, only four states sug-
gested that the rights to assemble, to due process, and against cruel 
and unusual punishment be guaranteed; only three states suggested 
that freedom of speech be guaranteed or that the accused be entitled 
to know the crime for which he would be tried, to confront his ac-
cuser, to present and cross-examine witnesses, to be represented by 
counsel, and to not be forced to incriminate himself; only two states 
proposed that double jeopardy be barred.74 Such unanimity helps 
69. LETIERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 51, at 124; see also id at 21-22. 
70. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 68, at 326. 
71. See id at 328, 335. 
72. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665 (197l)(empha-
sis added). 
73. Id at 675; see also note 83 infta. 
14. Id at 1167. 
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demonstrate that both Federalists and Anti-Federalists accepted an 
individual right to arms; the only debate was over how best to guar-
antee it. 
2. The Proposal and Rat!ftcation of the Second Amendment 
To secure ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists had 
committed themselves to the addition of "further guards for private 
rights ."75 To this end, the Federalists put forward Madison, the 
leading and most ardent supporter of the original Constitution in 
Congress, to draft the proposed amendments. Madison's own notes 
on his proposal reflect the ultimate organization of the Bill of 
Rights;76 his notes on the amendments, in which the right to arms 
appears very early, state that the amendments "relate first to private 
rights."77 Equally corrosive of the exclusively state's right view is the 
original organizational scheme revealed by Madison's notes. Not 
conceiving the idea of simply appending the whole set of amend-
ments to the Constitution as a discrete document (today's "Bill of 
Rights"), Madison intended to attach them to, or after, each section 
of the original Constitution to which they related. Had he viewed the 
right to arms as merely a limitation on article I, section S's provisions 
concerning congressional control over the militia, he would have in-
serted it in section 8 immediately after clauses 15 and 16. Instead, he 
planned to insert it with freedom of religion, of the press and various 
other personal rights in section 9, immediately following clause 3, 
which establishes the rights against bills of attainder and ex post 
facto laws.78 
Certainly the amendment was understood by Madison's congres-
sional colleagues as guaranteeing an individual right. For instance, 
in private correspondence Congressman Fisher Ames not@d of 
Madison's proposals that "the rights of conscience, of bearing arms, 
[etc.] . . . , are declared to be inherent in the people."79 In addition, 
two written interpretations on the proposed amendments were avail-
75. 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 307 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson ed. 1977) (letter of Oct. 
20, 1788, from Madison to Edmund Pendelton) (emphasis added). The Anti-Federalists' ob-
jections to the Constitution had not been limited to the lack of individual rights guarantees. 
For discussion of their objections to art. I, sec. I, see notes 86-89 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
16. See text at note 63 supra. 
77. See, e.g., 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 75, at 193-94. 
78. Id 
79. 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 52-53 (1854) (letter of June 11, 1789 to Thomas Dwight). 
The next day U.S. Senator William Gray wrote Patrick Henry that Madison had introduced a 
"string of amendments" which "respected personal liberty." 3 PATRICK HENRY 391 (1951 ); see 
also Senator Gallatin's letter of Oct. 7, 1789 ("essential and sacred rights" which "each indi-
vidual reserves to himself'), quoted in Halbrook, supra note 38, at 36 n.90. 
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able to the members of the first Congress.80 The first, and more au-
thoritative - by virtue of having received Madison's imprimatur -
was a widely reprinted article by his ally and correspondent Tench 
Coxe.8 I Having discussed the first amendment, Coxe moved on to 
describe the second in unmistakably individual right terms: 
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, 
may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be 
occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to 
the injury of their fellow citizens, the people are confirmed by the next 
article in their right to keep and bear their private arms. 82 
A similar interpretation appears from Anti-Federalist editorials. 
Samuel Adams, who had taken the modified Anti-Federalist posi-
tion of conditioning ratification upon the addition of a guarantee of 
personal rights, had proposed in the Massachusetts Convention that 
"the said constitution be never construed . . . to prevent the people 
of the United States who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their 
own arms."83 Anti-Federalist editorials triumphantly quoted this 
and Adams' other proposals as Madison's Bill of Rights was wend-
ing its way through the House of Representatives. The editorials 
crowed that the Anti-Federalist champion, Adams, had been vindi-
cated because "every one of' his proposals ( except the prohibition 
against a standing army) had been adopted in Madison's bill and 
"most probably will be adopted by the federal legislature."84 Calling 
upon the public to compare Madison's bill to Adams' previous pro-
posals, the editorials demanded that the Federalists "in justice there-
for for that long tried republican" formally acknowledge Samuel 
Adams as the real father of Madison's bill.85 
The significance of the bipartisan interpretation so partisanly re-
flected in these editorials and the Tench Coxe article is incontrovert-
ible. The arch-Federalist Coxe described the amendment as 
guaranteeing to the people "their private arms." The Anti-Federalist 
editorials agreed totally, seeing the amendment's language as identi-
80. Madison, apparently considering the amendment's language and purposes too clear to 
require co=ent, did not bother to discuss it in his introductory and subsequent remarks. 
81. Originally published under the pseudonym "A Pennsylvanian," these "Remarks on the 
First Part of the Amendments lo tlze Federal Constitution" first appeared in the Philadelphia 
Federal Gazette, June 18, 1789, at 2, col. 1. They were reprinted by the New York Packet, 
June 23, 1789, at 2, cols. 1-2, and by the Boston Centenniel, July 4, 1789, at 1, col. 2. 
Coxe sent a copy to Madison who replied co=ending its "explanatory strictures" of his 
proposal. 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, surpa note 75, at 257 (letter of June 24, 1789, to 
Tench Coxe). 
82. Coxe, supra note 81, at 2 (emphasis added). 
83. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 72, at 675. 
84. Editorial in the Boston Independent Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1789, at 2, col, 2. 
85. Id. 
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cal to Adams' previous clearly individual right formulation. If any 
member of the first Congress had any difficulty in understanding 
that the amendment's intention was to protect the individual posses-
sion of private arms by the general citizenry, these newspaper arti-
cles would surely have stilled it. Nor is there reason to imagine that 
they experienced any such difficulty. Absent some substantial reason 
particular to the context, the phrase "right of the people" clearly in-
dicates that an individual right was intended. The context here - its 
use throughout the Bill of Rights - consistently supports an individ-
ual right intent. 
The second amendment, then, was a response to the perceived 
lack of individual rights guarantees, not, as state's right proponents 
contend,86 a reaction to the standing army and militia control provi-
sions of article I, section 8. The latter source of Anti-Federalist 
wrath was simply not addressed by the second amendment.87 Noth-
ing on the face of the amendment deals with the article I, section 8, 
concerns; certainly Madison did not see it as changing those portions 
of the Constitution.88 The Anti-Federalists themselves were not pla-
cated by the amendment: when the proposed Bill of Rights reached 
the Senate, they unsuccessfully attempted to amend or repeal the of-
fending clauses. 89 Thus, the second amendment cannot be read as a 
response to the Anti-Federalist objections to article I, section 8. 
Rather, the fear of federal government encroachment on the states 
was allayed by guaranteeing the individual right to arms, and 
thereby, the arms of the militia. 
C. The Philosophical and Historical Origins of the Second 
Amendment 
The unanimity with which Federalists and Anti-Federalists sup-
86. See sources cited in notes 13-15 supra. The comments of Patrick Henry and George 
Mason typify those cited by the state's right advocates. See 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 68, at 43-
47, 379-81. 
87. The Anti-Federalists objected to the militia and standing army provisions on the 
ground that the federal government might so abuse its control of the militia - either by mak-
ing militia service intolerable or by failing to organize the militia at all - that a standing army 
would be necessary. Standing armies were considered a threat to the development of the virtu-
ous, self-reliant citizen on whom the vitality of the republic rested. See Shalhope, supra note 
12, at 604-07; notes 117-18 infra and accompanying text. The unwillingness of Madison and 
the other Federalists who dominated the first Congress to deprive the federal government of 
the military and militia powers conferred by the original Constitution will be discussed in 
detail by Dr. Joyce Malcolm (to whom I am indebted on this point) in her forthcoming book. 
88. See text at notes 76-78 supra. Madison modeled his draft of the amendments on the 
recommendations made by the state ratifying conventions, but deleted any language dealing 
with the art. I, sec. 8 concerns. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 72. 
89. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 72. 
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ported an individual right to arms is a reflection of their shared phil-
osophical and historical heritage.90 Examination of contemporary 
materials reveals that the Founders ardently endorsed firearms pos-
session as a personal right91 and that the concept of an exclusively 
state's right was wholly unknown to them. The most that such an 
examination does to dispel the amendment's individual right phrase-
ology is to suggest that the amendment had multiple purposes: the 
people were guaranteed "arms for their own personal defense, for 
the defense of their states and their nation, and for the purpose of 
keeping their rulers sensitive to the right of the people."92 In short, 
detailed exploration of the Founding Fathers' attitudes as expressed 
in their utterances powerfully supports an individual right interpre-
tation, though one which recognizes that the right was viewed as 
beneficial to society as a whole.93 
Though such attitudes are apparent in the Founders' utterances, 
such contemporary materials have been so completely ignored in 
90. The unanimity in the contemporary understanding of the second amendment helps 
explain the relative absence of recorded debate over it. What little debate there is appears at 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 778-80 (J. Gales ed. 1834) and relates to Madison's proposal that the 
amendment provide that "no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms." 
Elbridge Gerry assailed this provision, expressing the peculiar fear that it would give "an 
opportunity to the people in power to .•. declare who are those religiously scrupulous and 
prevent them from bearing arms." Gerry apparently feared that a particular faction in control 
of the federal government could mendaciously classify its opponents as conscientious objectors 
"and prevent them from bearing arms" in the militia. Moreover, the government might ex-
clude so vast a portion of the populace from service as to tum the militia into a "select militia" 
of their own faction, see note 52 supra and accompanying text, or as to require raising a stand-
ing army because of the militia's insufficiency. . 
Gerry's statement remains both ambiguous and tangential to the modem debate. The most 
that can be said is that his usage is consistent with Levin's and Smith's view that "bear arms" is 
used purely in the sense of carrying them in the course of militia service. But this only empha-
sizes the irrelevance of Gerry's remarks to the amendment's guarantee that arms might be 
kept. 
91. James Monroe included ''the right to keep and bear arms" in a list of basic "human 
rights" that he would propose be amended into the Constitution. See James Monroe Papers, 
N.Y. Public Library (miscellaneous papers in his own handwriting). See also 3 J. ELLIOT, 
supra note 68, at 386 (quoting Patrick Henry) (''The great object is, that every man be armed 
.... Everyone who is able may have a gun."); see also notes 79-81 supra-:and accompanying 
text. 
92. Shalhope, supra note 12, at 614. 
93. There is, of course, nothing untoward in the idea of a constitutional right bestowed 
upon private individuals for purposes that are largely (or even exclusively) public in nature. 
That is, after all, the earliest and best established explanation of freedom of expression. See, 
e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (freedom of expression promotes peace-
ful change in government pursuant to the public will, thereby obviating any need for violent 
change); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., con-
curring) (first amendment expresses Founders' faith that free competition in the marketplace 
of ideas is the only sure means of consistently achieving public policies best suited to the public 
welfare); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dis-
senting) (same); Meiklejohn, What .Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV, 461 
(1953) (freedom of expression is necessary to the American political process). 
November 1983) The Second Amendment 227 
much of the modem legal literature on the amendment that they re-
quire extended consideration here.94 Perhaps the difficulty exper-
ienced by many modem scholars in dealing with the Framers' 
positive attitudes toward gun ownership can be explained in terms of 
Bruce-Briggs' "culture conflict" theory of the gun control 
controversy: 
But underlying the gun control struggle is a fundamental division 
in our nation. The intensity of passion on this issue suggests to me that 
we are experiencing a sort of low-grade war going on between two al-
ternative views of what America is and ought to be. On the one side 
are those who take bourgeois Europe as a model of a civilized society: 
a society just, equitable, and democratic; but well ordered, with the 
lines of responsibility and authority clearly drawn, and with decisions 
made rationally and correctly by intelligent men for the entire nation. 
To such people, hunting is atavistic, personal violence is shameful, and 
uncontrolled gun ownership is a blot upon civilization. 
On the other side is a group of people who do not tend to be espe-
cially articulate or literate, and whose world view is rarely expressed in 
print. Their model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes 
I care of himself and his family with no interference from the state. 
They are "conservative" in the sense that they cling to America's 
unique pre-modem tradition - a non-feudal society with a sort of me-
dieval liberty at large for everyman. To these people, "sociological" is 
an epithet. Life is tough and competitive. Manhood means responsi-
bility and caring for your own.95 
If we assume that most modem scholars fall into the first of the 
modem value categories described, it becomes understandable why 
they might find the views of the Founders so foreign, indeed repug-
nant, as to eschew exploring them - instead reflexively projecting 
their own values onto the amendment. For the second of the value 
categories described accords perfectly with the views of the Foun-
ders, except that, as intellectuals themselves, its aura of anti-intellec-
tualism would have struck no responsive chord in them. 
94. Whatever the explanation for it, the fact that proponents of the exclusively state's right 
view have shunned exploration of the Founding Fathers' attitudes toward firearms cannot be 
gainsaid. None of the quotations referenced at notes 66-69 supra and 96-107 iefr~ are men-
tioned (much less discussed) in any of the state's right interpretation articles listed at note 13 
supra. The sole exception is Levin, who quotes Sam Adams' clearly individual right proposal, 
characterizing it as atypical. Levin,supra note 13, at 159. As will become evident, that charac-
terization is made viable only by a failure to discuss, or even acknowledge, the copious expres-
sions of similar sentiment set out in this Article. 
95. Bruce-Briggs,supra note 9, at 61. Various implications of this cultural confilct expla-
nation are explored in detail in w. R. TONSO, GUN AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND EXISTEN-
TIAL ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO FIREARMS, chs. 1, 2, 8 & 9 (1982) and in 
Tonso, supra note 11, at 330ff. See also Kessler, Gun Control: A Symbolic Crusade? (Mimeo, 
Rockhurst Coll., 1981). 
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I. Personal Attitudes of the Founders 
"One loves to possess arms," Thomas Jefferson, the doyen of 
American intellectuals, wrote to George Washington on June 19, 
1796.96 We may presume that Washington agreed, for his collection 
contained fifty guns, and his own writings are full of laudatory refer-
ences to various firearms he owned or examined.97 John Adams also 
agreed. In a book on American constitutional principles he sug-
gested that "arms in the hands of citizens" might appropriately be 
used in "private self-defense" or "under partial order of towns."98 
Likewise, writing after the ratification of the Constitution, but before 
the election of the First Congress, James Monroe included "the right 
to keep and bear arms" in a list of basic "human rights" that he 
would propose be added to the Constitution.99 
While Monroe and Adams both supported ratification of the 
Constitution, its most influential advocate was James Madison. In 
The Federalist No. 46 he confidently contrasted the federal govern-
ment it would create to the European despotisms he contemptuously 
described as "afraid to trust the people with arms." He assured his 
fellow countrymen that they need never fear their government be-
cause of "the advantage of being armed, which the Americans pos-
sess over the people of almost every other nation .... " 100 
Madison, who had, during the Revolution, exulted at his own and 
his militia comrades' ability to hit a target the size of a man's head at 
one hundred paces, many years later restated the sentiments of The 
Federalist No. 46 thusly: 
A government resting on a minority is an aristocracy, not a Republic, 
and could not be safe with a numerical and physical force against it, 
without a standing army, an enslaved press, and a disarmed 
populace.101 
On the other side of the ratification debate, Anti-Federalist Pat-
rick Henry left no doubt as to his feelings regarding the right to pos-
sess arms. During the Virginia ratification convention he objected 
equally to the Constitution's inclusion of clauses specifically author-
96. 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 341 (A.A. Lipscomb ed. 190~). 
97. Halsey, George Washington's Favorite Guns, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1968, at 23. In urg-
ing Congress to pass an act enrolling the entire adult male citizenry in a general militia, Presi-
dent Washington opined that "a free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined •••• " 
1 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 65 (Richardson ed.) Congress responded with the First Militia 
Act. See note 49 supra. 
98. 3 J. ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 475 (1787-88). 
99. James Monroe Papers, supra note 91. 
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 371 (J. Madison) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1864). 
101. R. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOG~HY, 64, 640 (1971). 
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izing a standing army and giving the federal government control of 
the militia, and to its omission of a clause forbidding disarmament of 
the individual citizen: ''The great object is that every man be 
armed .... Everyone who is able may have a gun."102 The Virginia 
delegates, remembering that the Revolutionary War had been 
sparked by the British attempt to confiscate the patriots' privately 
owned arms at Lexington and Concord, apparently agreed. Henry 
was appointed co-chairman of a committee to draft a Bill of Rights 
to be added to the Constitution.103 The other co-chairman was 
George Mason, whose warning against a federal constitution that 
failed to guarantee a right to arms has already been quoted.104 
Thomas Jefferson played little part in this debate from the re-
mote vantage of his position as ambassador to France, but his views 
on arms possession as a right may be deduced from the model state 
constitution he wrote for Virginia in 1776. That document included 
the explicit guarantee that "[n]o free man shall be debarred the use 
of arms in his own lands."105 All the evidence suggests that Jefferson 
was strongly in favor of gun ownership. A talented inventor and am-
ateur gunsmith himself, Jefferson maintained a substantial armory of 
pistols and long guns at Monticello and introduced the concept of 
interchangeable parts into American firearms manufacture.106 In a 
letter to a nephew (then fifteen) Jefferson offered the following 
advice: 
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercises, I 
advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the Body, it 
gives boldness, enterprise and independence to the mind. Games 
played with the ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for the 
body and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun therefore be 
the constant companion of your walks.107 
One intellectual historian has summarized the utterances of the 
Founding Fathers as expressing "an almost religious quality about 
the relationship between men and arms."108 When viewed in the 
light of this attitude and their English militia tradition, as buttressed 
102. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 68, at 45. 
103. Note, supra note 13, at 43. 
104. See note 68 supra and accompanying text. 
105. THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 51 (Foley ed., reissued 1967). 
106. Tarassuk & Wilson, Gun Collecting's Stately Pedigree, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1981, at 
24. 
107. THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 105, at 318. Another nephew tells us that 
Jefferson believed every boy should be given a gun at the age often, as Jefferson himself had 
been. T. JEFFERSON RANDOLPH, NOTES ON THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Edgehill Ran-
dolph Collection) (1879). 
108. C. Asbury, supra note IO, at 88. 
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by the republican philosophical school with which the Founders 
were familiar, the language of the second amendment becomes per-
fectly intelligible: believing self-defense an inalienable natural 
right, 109 and deriving from it the right to resist tyranny, 110 they guar-
anteed the right (derived from the foregoing) of individuals to pos-
sess arms. m Further, this also protected the possession of privately 
owned arms of the militia (which they understood to include most of 
the adult male population), 112 an institution they regarded as "neces-
sary to the security of a free state."113 
2. The Philosophical Environment of the Founding Fathers 
Fully as gr~at an obstacle to modem understanding as Bruce-
109. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4 ("Self-Defense, therefore, as it is 
justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be, in fact, taken away by the 
law of society."); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88, 95 (1964) ("a covenant not to defend myselfe 
from force by force is always voyd"); Halbrook, supra note 10, discussion at text accompany-
ing notes 56-78 supra (unpaginated manuscript) (analyzing views of Sidney and Locke). Eng-
lish and American divines went further still, declaring self-defense not simply a right but an 
obligation as well: 
He that suffers his life to be taken from him by one that hath no authority for that pur-
pose, when he might preserve it by defense, incurs the Guilt of self murder since God hath 
enjoined him to seek the continuance of his life, and Nature itself teaches every creature 
to defend himself . . . . 
C. Asbury, supra note 10, at 39-40 (quoting a 1747 Philadelphia sermon); see also id. at 28 
(English writers making the same point at the time of the Glorious Revolution). 
110. Eighteenth-century liberals derived the right to revolution against tyrants from Sid-
ney and Locke, who believed that all persons possessed a universally acknowledged personal 
right to defend themselves against robbery or enslavement. Throughout the writings of the 
Founders, and particularly in the debates over the Constitution, the equation between personal 
self-protection and resistance to tyranny occurs again and again: 
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no recourse left 
but in the exertion of that original right of self defense, which is paramount to all positive 
forms of government .... " 
THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 227 (J. Hamilton ed. 1864); see also Halbrook, supra note 38, at 
22-24 (similar statements from lesser known figures). 
111. For instance, Blackstone's classification of "arms for their defense" as being among 
the absolute rights of individuals was derived from "the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the vio-
lence of oppression." 1 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121, *143-44. 
112. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text. 
113. The Federalists viewed a small standing army as a necessity for dealing with the In-
dian threat and as a first line of defense against any foreign invasion. To them the militia and 
the armed citizenry from which it was raised were the ultimate defense in a military emergency 
too great to be dealt with by the standing army. The militia and armed citizenry were also the 
counter-poise to any danger posed by the standing army to personal liberty or the republican 
form of government. "Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed" argued 
the Federalists; the inherent danger of a standing army was ameliorated in the American situa-
tion where "the whole body of the people are armed and constitute a force superior to any 
band of regular troops that can be, on any pretense, raised .... " REPORT OF THE SUBCOM· 
MITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 4-6 (quoting Noah Webster and various 
other contemporary arguments in favor of ratification). The conventional pro-militia senti-
ment expressed in the amendment's language was as far as the Federalists would go to appease 
the Anti-Federalists. Id. 
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Briggs' culture conflict is the inattention of modern political philoso-
phy to "the dynamic relationship" that the Founders' philosophy 
saw "between arms, the individual, and society."114 Our world is the 
product of its history: our view of that world is the product of the 
lessons drawn from that history by the thinkers our society em-
braces. A conscious effort of will and imagination is necessary to 
assume the mind-set of eighteenth-century men whose education be-
gan with the classics, particularly the works of Plato, Aristotle and 
Cicero, and ended with the works of Sidney, Rousseau and Montes-
quieu. Thus were the Framers steeped in an understanding of lib-
erty grounded in the role of arms in society. Thus, 
the very character of the people - the cornerstone and strength of a 
republican society - was related to the individual's ability and desire 
to arm himself against threats to his person, his property and his 
state.115 
This viewpoint devolved upon eighteenth-century liberals 
through historical exegesis which was then viewed as the key to phil-
osophical truth. To them classical Greece and Rome represented the 
highest point that civilization had yet achieved - followed by a long 
dark age of brutal authoritarianism from which humanity in their 
time was still recovering. The history of the Greek city-states and 
"the Roman Republic provided at once an ideal and a condign 
warning of the frailty of republican institutions."116 Both that ideal 
and that warning were inextricably connected in the Founders' 
minds with the individual possession of arms. English and classical 
law recognized in arms possession the hallmark of citizenship and 
personal freedom. Thus the Greeks and Romans distinguished the 
mere helot or metic who was deemed to have no right to arms from 
the free citizen whose privilege and obligation it was to keep arms in 
his home so as always to be ready to defend his own rights and to 
rush to defend the walls when the tocsin warned of approaching ene-
mies. 117 The philosophical tradition embraced by the Founders re-
garded the survival of popular government and republican 
institutions as wholly dependent upon the existence of a citizenry 
that was "virtuous" in upholding that ancient privilege and obliga-
114. Shalhope, supra note 12, at 601. 
115. Id. at 604. 
116. Halbrook, supra note IO, at text accompanying n.31 (unpaginated manuscript); see 
also J. MALCOLM, supra note 12 (on the Framer's philisophical tradition); C. Asbury, supra 
note 10. 
ll1. See notes 43-44 & 54supra and accompanying text. James Burgh, the late-18th-cen-
tury English libertarian writer "most attractive to Americans," proclaimed that "the possession 
of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a slave," it being the ultimate means by 
which freedom was to be preserved. See Shalhope, supra note 12, at 604 (quoting Burgh). 
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tion. In this philosophy, the ideal of republican virtue was the 
armed freeholder, upstanding, scrupulously honest, self-reliant and 
independent - defender of his family, home and property, and 
joined with his fellow citizens in the militia for the defense of their 
polity.118 The congruence between this ideal of republican virtue 
and the second of the modem value attitudes described by Bruce-
Briggs is evident. 
The same thought that held arms ownership vital to republican 
citizenship also warned the Framers that to be disarmed by govern-
ment was tantamount to being enslaved by it; the possession of arms 
was the vital prerequisite to the right to resist tyranny. 119 The 
Founders learned from Aristotle that a basic characteristic of tyrants 
was "mistrust of the people; hence they deprive them of arms."120 
Aristotle showed that confiscation of the Athenians' personal arms 
had been instrumental to the tyrannies of the Peisistratus and the 
Thirty.121 Machiavelli taught the Founders that Augustus and Ti-
berius had similarly destroyed the Roman republic. 122 Only so long 
as Greek and Roman citizens retained their personal arms did they 
retain their personal liberties and their republican form of govern-
ment. That lesson··was brought home to the Founders by the entire 
corpus of political philosophy and historical exegesis they knew: 
"Among Renaissance theorists as dissimilar as Nicholas Machiavelli 
and Sir Thomas More, Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington, there 
was a concensus that only men willing and able to defend themselves 
could possibly preserve their liberties."123 The theme of personal 
118. In the line of republican political philosophers beginning with Machiavelli and ex-
tending through Harrington, Nedham, Sidney, Trenchard, Gordon and Rousseau, "[c]ivic vir-
tue came to be defined as the freeholder bearing arms in defense of his property and his state." 
Shalhope,supra note 12, at 603. For a discussion of classical republican theory, see J. PococK, 
THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 54 (1977), which states: 
The rigorous equation of arms-bearing with civic capacity is one of the Machiavelli's most 
enduring legacies to later political thinkers. . . • Classical [republican political] theory, 
especially in its Machiavellian form, had emphasized the notion that the bearing and 
possession of arms was the individual's passsport to citizenship. • . . 
(T]he concept of the people active in politics because disciplined arms was a vital 
component in republican and Machiavellian theory ..•. [Subsequent philosophers elab-
orated on it] in the rapturous oratory of ••• King People [based] not merely on rotatory 
balloting but on the union of "arms and counsel", bullets and ballots, in a setting in which 
the citizens appeared in arms to manifest their citizenship, casting their votes even as they 
advanced and retired in the evolutions of military exercise. 
119. See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text. 
120. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 218 (J. Sinclair trans. 1962). 
121. ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTlON 47, 105 (H. Rackham trans. 1935); see 
generally Halbrook supra note 10. 
122. MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 20 (E. Farnsworth trans. 1965). See generally J. 
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975). 
123. J. MALcoLM, supra note 12, at I. These elements in the thought of Machiavelli and 
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arms possession as both the hallmark and the ultimate guarantee of 
personal liberty appears equally in the writings of Cicero, Sidney, 
Locke, Trenchard, Rousseau, 124 Sir Walter Raleigh, 125 Blackstone126 
and Nedham. 127 That lesson must have been even more firmly ce-
mented in the Founders' minds by the fact that authoritarian philos-
ophers made the same observation in reverse, recommending arms 
prohibitions as the surest security for absolutism. 128 
Moreover, although the Founders' antipathy to gun bans arose 
out of political philosophy, it should not be supposed that eight-
eenth-century liberals were unaware of the crime control rationale 
for such legislation and had no answer to it. In the French despot-
ism they abhorred, the single most important duty of the police, 
"protecting" the public security, was effected through enforcing arms 
prohibitions. 129 Although actually aimed at continuing the subordi-
nation of the peasantry, the ostensible reason for the French arms 
prohibition was to reduce homicide and other violent crime, and so 
was it rationalized by the French monarchs and their apologists. 130 
The Founders gave such arguments short shrift, believing that if a 
population were actually unfit to possess arms, it was only because of 
the degradation induced by subjection to the oppression and ex-
ploitation of aristocratic and monarchical authoritarianism. 131 For a 
Hobbes were relayed to the Founding Fathers through Sidney, Locke and Rousseau. See 
Halbrook, supra note 10. 
The works of Harrington provided an equally important conduit for bringing these views 
to the Founders. "[I]t was [Harrington] who had first stated in English terms, the theses that 
only the armed freeholder was capable of independence and virtue .... " J. PococK, supra 
note l 18, at 145. "As [the 17th Century) went on its way, Harringtonian and neo-Har-
ringtonian ideas were absorbed into the opposition tradition of Whig political culture, a pow-
erful current of thought whose effects can be traced in Europe and America, as well as in 
England and Scotland." Id. at 143. 
124. See Halbrook, supra note 10; see also Shalhope, supra note 12, at 603 (quoting 
Trenchard and Moyle to the effect that classical republics and commonwealths had maintained 
popular liberty by "a general Exercise of the best of their People in the use of Arms, . . . the 
People being secured thereby as well against the Domestick Affronts of any of their own Citi-
zens, as against the Foreign Invasions of ambitious and unruly Neighbors.") 
125. See Shalhope, supra note 12, at 602. 
126. See l w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143-44; 2 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *411-12 (citation of classical examples). 
127. See, e.g., NEDHAM, THE RIGHT CONSTITUTION OF A COMMONWEALTH (1656) quoted 
in J. ADAMS, supra note 98, at 471-72. 
128. See Halbrook, supra note 10, discussion at notes 3-16 and 48-51 supra (discussing 
Plato and Jean Bodin). 
129. I. CAMERON, CRIME AND REPRESSION IN THE AUVERGNE AND THE GUYENNEA 1720-
1790, at 7-8 ( 1982). 
130. See L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 8-16; see also Halbrook, supra 
note 10, discussion at notes 48-51 supra (discussing Jean Bodin). 
131. If pressed, Madison might have admitted that the European despotisms he contemp-
tuously dismissed as "afraid to trust the people with arms," see note 100 supra and accompa-
nying text, were nevertheless justified in denying arms to populations so brutalized and 
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free and virtuous people, eighteenth-century liberalism's response, as 
formulated by Montesquieu and Beccaria, to the crime control argu-
ment was simply an expansive rhetorical rendition of today's slogan 
''when guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns." 
False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real advantages for 
one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would take fire from men 
because it burns, and water because one may drown in it; that has no 
remedy for evils, except destruction. The laws that forbid the carrying 
of arms are laws of such a nature. They disarm those only who are 
neither inclined nor determined to commit crimes. Can it be supposed 
that those who have the courage to violate the most sacred laws of 
humanity, the most important of the code, will respect the less impor-
tant and arbitrary ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity, 
and which, if strictly obeyed, would put an end to personal liberty -
so dear to men, so dear to the enlightened legislator - and subject 
innocent persons to all the vexations that the guilty alone ought to suf-
fer? Such laws make things worse for the assaulted and better for the 
assailants; they serve rather to encourage than to prevent homicides, 
for an unarmed man may be attacked with greater confidence than an 
armed man. They ought to be designated as laws not preventive but 
fearful of crimes, produced by the tumultuous impression of a few iso-
lated facts, and not by thoughtful consideration of the inconveniences 
and advantages of a universal decree. 132 
demoralized by generations of subjection to the ancien regime as to be unfit to possess them. 
By contrast, the proud, gun-loving Americans were upstanding, responsible, strong, independ-
ent, self-reliant - the epitome of virtuous republican citizenship. Expressing this self-satisfied 
attitude, Joel Barlow wrote of Americans, "[i]t is because the [Americans] are civilized," i.e., 
not demoralized by oppression or luxury, "that they are with safety armed": 
The danger (where there is any) from armed citizens, is only to the government, not to the 
society; and as long as they have nothing to revenge in the government (which they can-
not have while it is in their own hands) there are many advantages in their being accus-
tomed to the use of arms, and no possible disadvantage. 
Shalhope, supra note 12, at 607 (quoting Barlow in Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Sev-
eral States of Europe: Resulting From the Necessity and Propriety of a General Revolution in the 
Principle of Government) (emphasis in original). Similarly, Timothy Dwight stated, 
[l]f proper attention be paid to the education of children in knowledge and religion, few 
men will be disposed to use arms, unless for their amusement, and for the defense of 
themselves and their country. 
Shalhope, supra note 12, at 607 (quoting Timothy Dwight in Travels in New England and New 
York). Nevertheless, the Founders were not so Panglossian about the American character as to 
blind themselves to the fact that even among the virtuous there would always be a tiny fraction 
of evilly-disposed people whom it would be desirable to disarm selectively. See notes 258 & 
261 infra and accompanying text. 
132. C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS 145 (1819). Originally published in 
1764, this work was sufficiently familiar to the colonists ten years later for John Adams to have 
opened the Boston Massacre trial by quoting from it. See 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 
28 (1965). Montesquieu's pejorative remarks on gun prohibitions (which may well have influ-
enced Beccaria's) appear at 2 Montesquieu, SPIRIT OF LAWS 79-80 (Nugent trans., Colonial 
Press 1900). 
The English libertarian/republican philosophers were, if anything, even more solicitous 
than Beccaria and Montesquieu (who lived on the relatively peaceful Continent) of the right to 
possess arms for the defense of family, home and self from criminal attack as well as the 
oppression of government. As Shalhope noted, amidst the endemic criminal violence of 16th-
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The influence of the republican philosophical tradition of the 
armed people upon the Founding Fathers is obvious from their own 
statements.133 Likewise, the writings of lesser known figures and 
newspaper editorials of the period abound with favorable references 
to the citizenry's widespread possession of personal arms as charac-
teristic of the "diffusion of power" necessary to preserve liberty. 
These writings also express fears that the new federal government 
might disarm the populace, leading to a "monopoly of power [which] 
is the most dangerous of all monopolies."134 In short, the accepted 
philosophy of the times treated the right to arms as among the most 
vital of personal rights. 
3. English Gun Prohibition and the English Bill of Rights 
Further evidence of the link between republican government and 
the possession of arms was given the Founders by their view of the 
mother country's history. Despite England's lack of a police force, 
legislation prohibiting possession of firearms by others than the high 
nobility had been instituted under the aegis of the hated Game 
Acts. 135 Though the ostensible purpose was to protect England's 
dwindling game resources, the Acts' covert purpose was confirmed 
by Blackstone: "prevention of popular insurrections and resistance 
to the government, by disarming the bulk of the people . . . is a 
reason oftener meant than avowed .... " 136 Particularly indicative 
of the nefarious intent of the 1671 Game Act ( at least to the minds of 
the Founders) was that it was evidently modeled on the French ex-
ample, 137 and had appeared in the reign of Charles II. Living as we 
do several centuries removed, in an age in which religious tolerance 
is so much the norm as to be taken for granted, it is difficult for us to 
understand the almost hysterical execration the Founders felt for the 
restored Stuarts. The dissolute and debauched Charles II had 
martyred Algernon Sidney, the Founders' beloved philosopher of 
the armed people. Charles and his upright but intolerantly Catholic 
18th century England, "[t]he individual's need to protect himself from vicious fellow citizens 
and corrupt authorities - both banes of any republican society - also became clear." 
Shalhope, supra note 12, at 603; see also note 140 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
133. See notes 96-113 supra and accompanying text. 
134. Halbrook, supra note 38, at 33 (quoting Political Maxims, New York Daily Adver-
tiser, Aug. 15, 1789, at 2, col 1). 
135. The Game Act of 1671, 22 Cor. II, c. 25 § 3. 
136. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *412. 
137. The Game Act of 1671 followed the French pattern in limiting firearms possession to 
the nobility. The French legislation went even further in that it prohibited commoners from 
possessing swords as well as guns. See M. JOSSERANT & J. STEVENSON, PISTOLS, REVOLVERS 
AND AMMUNmON 271-72 (1972); L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, supra note 23. 
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brother James II were viewed as traitors who had plotted to place 
England under the yoke of their Catholic ally Louis XIV of France; 
through the mechanisms of a standing army and the importation of 
French troops, the free English population was to be disarmed and 
reduced to the condition of the French peasantry, and the Protestant 
religion was to be extirpated with fire and sword in England as Louis 
had done in France.13s 
Arms confiscation was a basic technique of the absolutism that 
the Stuarts, at least in the Framers' eyes, had determined to impose 
on England after their return from exile in France. To that end both 
Charles and James seized upon a series of new and old confiscatory 
devices, not the least of which was the 1671 Game Act.139 Conscious 
of the disaffection of many of his subjects, and of the precariousness 
of his hold on the rest, the wily Charles never went beyond sporadic 
and highly selective arms confiscations. But enforcement under the 
Game Act and other legislation was enormously (though still selec-
tively) increased during James' short reign. In addition to disarming 
the actively rebellious, this policy deterred the expression of any 
kind of dissent or opposition. In an age as subject to apolitical crime 
and violence as seventeenth- to eighteenth-century England, few 
people were courageous or foolhardy enough to want to live without 
weapons to defend themselves and their families. 140 
Having rid itself of James through the "Glorious Revolution," 
Parliament composed a list of grievances against him, turning it into 
a Bill of Rights to which royal assent was required as part of the 
compact under which William and Mary were allowed to ascend the 
English throne. Seventh among the grievances was that James had 
caused his Protestant subjects "to be disarmed at a time when Papists 
were both armed and imployed [sic] contrary to law."141 It was con-
comitantly guaranteed "that the subjects which are Protestant may 
have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as al-
lowed by law." The significance of the phrase "as allowed by law" is 
138. M. DAVIDSON, THE HORIZON CONCISE HISTORY OF FRANCE 96 (1971); J, GARRITY & 
P. GAY, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 738 (1972). 
139. These devices and the uses made of them are detailed in J. MALCOLM, supra note 12, 
at chs. 2-4; Malcolm, supra note 10, and the REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONST!· 
TUTION, supra note 10, at 2-3, from which this narrative follows. See also notes 148-50 infra 
and accompanying text. 
140. Throughout the colonial and pre-colonial period, England suffered a remarkable de-
gree of violence surprising in light of its relative peacefulness today. See, e.g., J. OSBORNE, 
THE SILENT REVOLUTION 9 (1970) ("[T]he English were noted throughout Europe for their 
turbulence and proclivity to violence."); Gurr, Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical 
Review of Evidence, 3 ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (1981). 
141. W. & M. Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). 
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unclear. It could have been meant to specify that the right to arms 
which Protestants (who then composed about ninety-eight percent of 
the English population)142 were receiving was no greater than that 
which had pre-existed at common law. To avoid a lengthy debate 
which might delay the Bill's enactment, Parliament had strictly 
agreed that "no new principle of law'' was to be included; the Bill 
was to be "a mere recital of those existing rights of Parliament and of 
the subject, which James had outraged, and which William must 
promise to observe."143 
More likely, Parliament meant the phrase "as allowed by law'' to 
preserve its own power to disarm the subjects, simply clarifying that 
only the king was prevented from doing so. If this is what the phrase 
stood for, the qualification it adds to the English Bill of Rights is 
manifestly unimportant in interpreting the second amendment, 
which was expressly intended to restrict the legislative as well as the 
executive branch.144 Partisans of the exclusively state's right theory 
have seemed to invest the question of Parliament's power with some 
significance, commenting that twentieth-century England has 
adopted one of the world's most stringent anti-gun policies, notwith-
standing the 1689 Bill of Rights.145 If this is intended to suggest that 
Congress is free to do likewise, it completely misses the distinction 
between the American system of constitutional rights and the non-
constitutional English system in which even the most sacrosanct 
142. Cf. J. JONES, THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND 77 n. 2 (1972) (Catholics com-
prised 2% of the population of England during the 17th century). As Smith points out, Cathol-
icism was illegal and Catholics were banned from public office in England through the mid-
19th century. J. Smith, supra note 10, at 24. · 
143. G. TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1688-1689, at 150-51 (1954). 
144. Madison's notes in formulating the Bill of Rights expressly reflect his dissatisfaction 
with the English Bill of Rights because it applied only to Protestants and because, being no 
more than an act of one Parliament, it was subject to repeal by a later one. 12 PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 75, at 193-94. Indeed, the Founders apparently believed that con-
temporary English arms policies were highly restrictive and assigned the blame for this to the 
defective and equivocal language of the English Bill of Rights. Provincial Americans like 
Madison, who had never been abroad, gained their knowledge of current English institutions 
and character from the hyperbolic philipics of the alienated English republican/libertarian 
philosophers. Thus the Continental Congress compared our robust men, "trained to arms 
from their infancy and animated by the love of liberty," to the "debauched" British popula-
tion, so corrupted by "luxury and dissipation" that they had allowed themselves to be dis-
armed and made utterly dependent on a standing army. Shalhope, supra note 12, at 606. 
Similarly, St. George Tucker, a distinguished American jurist and member of Madison's Vir-
ginia circle, contemptuously compared the second amendment's unqualified guarantee to the 
English Bill of Rights, which he believed to be so rotten with exceptions "that not one man in 
five hundred can keep a gun in house without being subject to a penalty." 1 ST. G. TUCKER, 
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND 
LAW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 143 n.40 (1803). 
145. See, e.g., Feller & Gotting, supra note 13, at 49 n.10; G. NEWTON & F. ZINRING, 
supra note 13, at 225. · 
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rights guaranteed by one Parliament may be abrogated by its succes-
sors. Parliament's power to disarm no more proves that Congress 
can violate the second amendment than the fact that twentieth-cen-
tury Parliaments have abolished various traditional rights of the 
criminally accused in Northern Ireland146 proves that Congress is 
free to legislate in derogation of the fourth, fifth and sixth 
amendments. 
What is significant about the English Bill of Rights is the undeni-
able support that it provides for the individual right position. There 
were no states in England to be protected against disarmament. So 
what Parliament was complaining of could only have been the 
seizure of arms from individual citizens in violation of their common-
law rights. Because the Founders knew that the English forerunner 
to their own Bill of Rights contained an individual right to arms, and 
because the Founders themselves emphatically endorsed such a 
right, it seems unlikely that the right to arms which they wrote into 
their own Constitution was not intended, at least partly, to protect 
such an individual right. 
To avoid the highly adverse implications of the English Bill of 
Rights, some state's right exponents have resorted to what can only 
be described as fudging the facts. They deny that James II was actu-
ally confiscating any arms from his Protestant subjects. They assert, 
instead, that Parliament used the word "disarmed" merely figura-
tively, referring to the fact that James had replaced various Protes-
tant officials with Catholics, particularly in the English military. 147 
This interpretation is demonstrably untrue. Space does not permit 
full detailing of the later Stuarts' arms confiscation efforts. 148 Suffi-
cient for present purposes are the details noted in the Report of the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution: 
In 1662, the Militia Act was enacted empowering officials "to 
search for and seize all arms in the custody or possession of any person 
or persons whom the said lieutenants or any two or more of their depu-
ties shall judge dangerous to the peace of the kingdom." Gunsmiths 
were ordered to deliver to the government lists of all purchasers. 
146. See generally Bishop, Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The British 
Laboratory Experience, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 140 (1978). 
147. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 426: 
As one co=entator has pointed out, these grievances were not intended to assert that 
James II disarmed Protestants in any literal sense, but instead referred to his practice of 
replacing Protestants with Catholics at important military posts . . . . 
The co=entator referred to is Weatherup, supra note 13, at 973. 
148. These efforts are the subject of a forthcoming book by Dr. Joyce Malcolm. The re-
sults of her exhaustive original research in English records (many of which are available only 
in that country) are su=arized in J.MALCOLM, supra note 12; Malcolm, supra note 10. 
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These confiscations were continued under James II, who directed them 
particularly against the [Protestant] Irish population: "Although the 
country was infested by predatory bands, a Protestant gentleman could 
scarcely obtain permission to keep a brace of pistols." [Quoting Ma-
cauley's History of England; footnotes deleted.] 
In 1688, the government of James was overturned in a peaceful 
uprising which came to be known as "The Glorious Revolution." Par-
liament resolved that James had abdicated and promulgated a Decla-
ration of Rights, later enacted as the Bill of Rights. Before coronation, 
his successor William of Orange, was required to swear to respect these 
rights. The debates in the House of Commons over this Declaration of 
Rights focused largely upon disarmament under the 1662 Militia Act. 
One member complained that "an act of Parliament was made to dis-
arm all Englishmen, who the lieutenant should suspect, by day or 
night, by force or otherwise - this was done in Ireland for the sake of 
putting arms into Irish [Catholic] hands." The speech of another is 
summarized as "militia bill - power to disarm all England - now 
done in Ireland." A third complained of "Arbitrary power exercised 
by the ministry . . . Militia - imprisoning without reason; disarming 
-himself disarmed." Yet another summarized his complaints "Militia 
Act - an abominable thing to disarm the nation .... " 149 
These and various other examples establish beyond peradventure 
that James II aggressively enforced the largely dormant arms pro-
scriptions he had inherited so as to affect not only the common peo-
ple but some of their elected representatives,150 that this policy was 
diametrically contrary to the principles of the common law as they 
were then understood, and that one purpose of the English Bill of 
Rights was to place the possession of arms beyond monarchical in-
terference - at least as far as the Protestant ninety-eight percent of 
the population was concemed.1s 1 
149. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMlTI'EE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note IO, at 2-3. 
150. One of the Members of Parliament was Sir John Knight, former Mayor of Bristol 
(then England's second city), and the defendant in Rex v. Knight, 87 Eng. Rep. 73 (K.B. 
1686). This case's rejection of James Il's attempt to prosecute so prominent a Protestant under 
the arms laws was a cause celebre and one of the events leading to the Glorious Revolution. 
Personal communication from Dr. Malcolm. 
151. Having nullified the 1671 Game Act's gun prohibition by the 1689 Bill of Rights, 
Parliament went on to delete the prohibition in subsequent Game Acts. See, e.g., 4 & 5 W. & 
M. 23 (1692); 6 Anne 16 (1706); see also Rex v. Gardner, 7 Mod. 279, 280, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240, 
1241 (K.B. 1739) (holding that these Game Acts do "not extend to prohibit a man from keep-
ing a gun for his necessary defense"); Mallock v. Eastly, 7 Mod. 482, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 
1744) ("the mere having a gun was no offense within the game laws, for a man may keep a gun 
for the defense of his house and family''). Writing in 1793, Edward Christian, the English 
editor of Blackstone's 12th edition, annotated Blackstone's strictures against the gun confisca-
tion provisions of the Game Acts with the comment that these had long since been repealed so 
that "every one is at liberty to keep or carry a gun, if he does not use it for the destruction of 
game." 2 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 411 (12th ed. London 1793-95). Even Catholics, 
though forbidden to stockpile arms, were acknowledged the right to retain such as were neces-
sary to defend their homes by the 1689 "Act for better securing the Government by disarming 
Papists and reputed Papists." I W. & M. sess. I, ch. 15 (1689). 
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D. Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Interpretation 
of the Second Amendment 
The final proof that an individual right was guaranteed by the 
second amendment lies in Madison's formulation of the amendment 
in terms that he must have known his contemporaries would inter-
pret as protecting an individual right. As we shall see, that is how 
his contemporaries did read the amendment. Fundamental to under-
standing the original intention behind the Constitution is the obser-
vation that the Founders 
were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and 
thought and spoke in its vocabulary. . . . [W]hen they came to put their 
conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they 
expressed them in terms of the common law, co'!fident that they would 
be shortly and easily understood. [For that reason,] the language of the 
Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the 
common law and to British institutiC\ns as they were when the instru-
ment was framed and adopted.152 
Reference to the great common law commentators known to the 
Founders shows Hawkins, Bracton and Coke all affirming the exist-
ence of a common law right to possess arms for home defense, while 
Blackstone included that right among those he classified as the five 
"absolute rights of individuals" at common law.153 
Not only the great common law commentators, but also the Eng-
lish courts affirmed the individual right to arms. When Parliament 
overthrew the Stuarts, it wrote the common law liberty to possess 
arms into the English Bill of Rights. Thereafter English court deci-
sions, reports of which were available to the Founders, had recog-
nized that "a man may keep a gun for the defense of his house and 
family," denying that the Game Acts then current "prohibit a man 
from keeping a gun for his necessary defense. . . ."154 Moreover, 
the English Game Acts that prohibited firearms had never been a 
part of the colonial law,155 which the Founders knew from their own 
152. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) (emphasis added). 
153. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *I44;seealso 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 161-62 (5th 
ed. 1671); III HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 20-25 
(Twiss ed. 1880); I W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135-36 (5th ed. 1771). 
154. Mallock v. Eastly, 7 Mod. 482, 489, 87 Eng. Rep. 1370, 1374 (K.B. 1744); Rex v. 
Gardner, 7 Mod. 279, 280, 87 Eng. Rep. 1240, 1241 (K.B. 1739); see note 151 supra. These 
cases were printed in English law reports that were available both in the personal collections of 
American lawyers and in American law libraries by the mid-18th CC!].tury. In addition, the 
Gardner opinion is reported almost in full in a volume referred to by Blackstone. R. BURNS, 
THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER, Game§ 8, at 442 (1755); see 4 w. BLACK• 
STONE, COMMENTARIES • 175, n.•r. This legal commentary was available in the colonies. 
The Adams family donated John Adams' personal copy to the Boston Public Library, which 
still owns it. See J. Smith, supra note 10, at 63. 
155. Although colonial law was generally derived from English common law, any common 
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experience and to which they presumably referred in determining 
what the pre-existing "rights" were that the amendment guaranteed. 
Not only did colonial law allow every trustworthy adult to possess 
arms, but it deemed this right so vital that every colony or state had 
exempted firearms from distraint for execution because of debt. 156 
Given this background, it is inconceivable that Madison and his col-
leagues in the first Congress would have chosen the language they 
did for the amendment unless they intended a personal right. They 
must necessarily have known that their undefined phrase "right of 
the people to keep and bear arms" would be understood by their 
contemporaries in light of to common law formulations like Black-
stone's "absolute rights of individuals." 
That indeed is precisely how their contemporaries did interpret 
it. The second amendment was analyzed in at least four legal com-
mentaries, authored by men who were closely acquainted with 
Madison or other members of the first Congress. The earliest of 
these commentaries, written by Madison's ally Tench Coxe, has al-
ready been quoted. 157 Next came St. George Tucker's 1803 edition 
of Blackstone's Commentaries, annotated to explain parallel devel-
opments in American law.158 We may assume that Tucker was 
learned in American law since he was a justice of the most distin-
guished court of his day, the Virginia Supreme Court. His familiarity 
with the thought underlying the Bill of Rights may also be assumed. 
Not only was he an important member of the generation that pro-
duced it, but the Virginia circles in which he moved included both 
Madison and Jefferson. 159 Tucker annotated Blackstone's inclusion 
law or statutory principle inapplicable to the situation or conditions prevailing in the colonies 
was excluded. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW§ 9, at 60 (1972); Smith, The 
English Criminal Law in Early America in J. SMITH & T. BARNES, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYS-
TEM: CARRY OVER To THE COLONIES 14-17 (1975). Parliamentary acts designed to provide 
the nobility a monopoly both of arms and of the shrinking English game resources were 
plainly inapplicable to the colonies, where there was no nobility and the supply of game 
seemed inexhaustible. It bears emphasis in this connection that the import of English co=on 
law precedent in interpreting the American Bill of Rights "is subject to the qualification that 
the co=on law rule invoked shall not be one rejected by our ancestors as unsuited to their 
civil or political condition." Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936); see also 
note 234 infra. 
156. See J. Smith, supra note 10, at 34. In general, the colonies and early states knew only 
four kinds of gun laws: (a) those which required/allowed every trustworthy citizen to possess 
arms, both for militia service and otherwise; (b) those prohibiting gun ownership or carrying 
for Indians and blacks; (c) those which prohibited hunting or shooting in or near urban areas; 
and (d) those which prohibited the carrying or brandishing of arms in such a manner as to 
cause fear. 
157. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text. 
158. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, supra note 144. 
159. "The Jefferson Papers in the Library of Congress show that both Tucker and Rawle 
were friends of, and corresponded with, Thomas Jefferson." REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
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of the right to possess firearms as among the "absolute rights of indi-
viduals" in England, with the observation that in America this right 
had been constitutionalized by the enactment of the second amend-
ment. 160 William Rawle, whose general commentary on the Consti-
tution appeared in 1825, seems also to have never considered any but 
an individual right interpretation of the second amendment. Rawle 
was both influential and well-known enough to have been offered 
the attorney generalship several times by Washington. 161 So far was 
Rawle from the state's right concept that he flatly declared that the 
second amendment prohibited state, as well as federal, laws disarm-
ing individuals. 162 More enduring in its fame than Rawle's work, 
though not necessarily more influential in its time, is the Commenta-
ries on the Constitution of Mr. Justice Story, a younger contemporary 
of the Founders and a Jefferson appointee to the United States 
Supreme Court. He, too, eulogized "[t]he right of the citizens to keep 
and bear arms" as "the palladium of the liberties of a republic."163 
One further point about the contemporaneity of these commenta-
ries suggests itself: as we have seen, Coxe's article received 
Madison's approval even before the Amendment's enactment. 164 
Published almost fifteen years thereafter, St. George Tucker's Amer-
ican edition of Blackstone became a standard reference work on An-
glo-American common law for early nineteenth-century Americans. 
Literally hundreds of those who had served in Congress or state leg-
islatures during the enactment of the Bill of Rights were still alive at 
that time. Many of them, including Madison himself, were still liv-
ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 7. The Jefferson papers archived at the Library of 
Congress contain 22 letters between Jefferson and Tucker spanning the period 1775 to 1809. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INDEX TO THOMAS JEFFERSON'S PAPERS 139 (Wash. D.C., Govt. 
Printing Off. 1976). Their actual correspondence probably exceeded this, since much of Jeffer-
son's pre-1780 correspondence was lost when the British occupied Richmond in that year. Id. 
at viii. Tucker's association with Madison began at least as early as the Annapolis Convention 
of 1786 to which they were both delegates. See M. COLEMAN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER, CITIZEN 
OF No MEAN CITY 87, 124, 182. In addition, both Tucker's brother and his best friend were 
members of the first Congress. Id. at 35, 61, 113-14. 
160. 1 ST. G. TUCKER, supra note 144, at 143 n.40, 300. 
161. D. BROWN, EULOGIUM UPON WILLIAM RAWLE 15 (1837). As to Rawle's correspon-
dence and friendship with Jefferson, see note 159 supra. The Jefferson papers include five 
letters between them in the 1792-1793 period. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 159, at 118. 
162. w. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION 125-26 (2d ed. 1829). Rawle shared this 
view with Hamilton, who saw the people's possession of arms as guaranteeing freedom from 
state as well as from federal tyranny. The armed populace, "by throwing themselves into 
either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate" against either a federal or a state invasion of 
popular rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 228 (A. Hamilton) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1864), 
163. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 746 (1833) (emphasis added). 
164. See note 81 supra. 
November 1983] The Second Amendment 243 
ing twenty-five years later when Rawle's and Story's commentaries 
were published.165 Those commentaries remained the standard 
nineteenth-century reference works on the Constitution at least until 
Cooley appeared.166 If these commentaries were erroneously 
presenting as an individual right of the people what was intended to 
be only a collective right of the states, surely one or more former 
legislators would have remonstrated the authors or publishers and, if 
correction was not forthcoming, publicly clarified the record. 
To reiterate, the amendment was written in language which its 
authors would have adopted only if they intended to secure an indi-
vidual right, because they knew that that was how their audience 
would inevitably understand it. Equally dispositive, that audience, 
composed of people like Coxe, Tucker, Rawle, and Story of the 
Framers' own generation, and of judges and commentators from the 
succeeding generations closest in time to the Framers, uniformly did 
so understand the amendment.167 The general rule in constitutional 
construction is one of deference to contemporary interpretations 
with the greatest weight being accorded those interpretations closest 
in time to the enactment of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion.168 The tone and unanimity of contemporary interpretation of 
the second amendment discloses what was apparently a perfectly 
clear understanding to those generations closest in time to the 
amendment's formulation. Thus, an exclusively state's right theory 
cannot survive the observation that it is so much a product of the 
twentieth century that neither the Framers nor any eighteenth- or 
nineteenth-century commentator or court breathed even the slightest 
intimation of it. 
165. Madison lived until 1836, reiterating to the last his belief in an individually armed 
citizenry. See notes 96-113 supra and accompanying text. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson 
both died on July 4, 1826. Without attempting to document the longevity of each legislator 
who passed on the amendment, thumbing through D. MORRIS & I. MORRIS, WHO w AS WHO 
IN AMERICAN PoLmcs (1974), yields the following dates of death: U.S. Senator Albert Galla-
tin, 1849; U.S. Representative Jeremiah Smith, 1842; U.S. Senator Paine Wingate, 1838; U.S. 
Senator Aaron Burr, 1836. 
166. The individual right interpretation seems to have been as self evident to Cooley as it 
was to his predecessors Rawle and Story. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERlCA 298-99 (3d ed. 1898); cf. T. Coo-
LEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WmcH REsT UPON THE LEGISLA-
TIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERlCAN UNION 498-99 (7th ed. 1903) (federal and 
state constitutions protect the right to bear arms). 
167. For 19th-century judicial interpretation, see notes 169-84 infra and accompanying 
text. 
168. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969). 
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II. SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS 
In attempting to identify a pre-twentieth century origin for the 
exclusively state's right position, several of its proponents have noted 
that one pre-1789 state constitutional guarantee of a right to arms, 
and several early post-1789 ones specified a "common defense" pur-
pose, without mentioning any individual self-defense purpose. 169 If 
such provisions had been interpreted as not guaranteeing an individ-
ual right to provide for common defense, they would be persuasive 
evidence that such a position was known to the Framers. Instead, 
every one of the twenty-two pre-1906 state cases construing a state 
constitutional right to arms provision, including some provisions that 
referred only to a common defense purpose, recognized an individ-
ual right to possess at least militia-type arms. 170 A nonindividual 
right interpretation first appeared in a 1906 Kansas decision which is 
plainly wrong even as a construction of the Kansas constitution.171 
169. See, e.g., MAss. CONST. of 1780, 1st Part, art. XVII (''The people have a right to keep 
and to bear arms for the co=on defence."). Other pre-20th-«ntury state constitutional pro-
visions with a right to arms "for the [or their] co=on defence" include ARK. CONST. of 1836, 
art. II,§ 21; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I,§ 21; ME. CONST. of 1819, art. l, § 16; s.c. CONST. of 
1868, art. I,§ 28; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI,§ 26; see also GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I,§ 4 
("A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. III (same as Georgia, 
plus: "This shall not prevent the passage of laws to punish those who carry weapons con-
cealed."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVII ("for the defence of thei 
state"). 
But see, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIII (''The people have a right 
to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.") (emphasis added). Other early state 
constitutional provisions providing for a right to arms "for the defence of themselves [or him-
self] and the state" include the following: ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I,§ 23; CONN. CONST. of 
1818, art. I,§ 17; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I,§ 20; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII,§ 23; MICH. 
CONST. of 1835, art. I,§ 13; Miss. CONST. of 1817, art. I,§ 23; Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, 
§ 3; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21; VT. CONST. of 
1777, ch. I,§ 15. 
170. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 34 Am. Rep. 52 (1878); Nunn v. State, l Ga. 243 (1846); 
In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902); Bliss v. Co=onwealth, 12 Ky. 90, 2 Litt, 80 
(1822); Andrews v. State, SO Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871); Smith v. lshenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 
Cold.) 214 (1866); State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 55 A. 610 (l903);see State v. Reid, l Ala. 612, 
619 (1840); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 459-62 (1876); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27, 32 (1842); 
Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474-75 (1874); State v. Chandler, S La. Ann. 489 (1850); Aymette v. 
State, 21 Tenn. 154, 2 Hum. 119 (1840); Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. 356, S Yer. 292 (1833); 
Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859); cf. State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833) 
(statute prohibiting wearing or carrying concealed weapons is constitutional); State v. Jumel, 
13 La. Ann. 399 (1858) (same); State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250, 5 Ired .. 181 (1844) (same); State 
v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875) (similar statute); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872) (statute 
prohibiting certain unusual weapons is constitutional); State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367,373, 
14 S.E. 9 (1891) (concealed weapon statute). 
171. See Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905); note 31 supra. This case, which 
presents a "collective right" theory, is sometimes viewed as an early example of the exclusively 
state's right approach. It is difficult to believe, however, that the Kansas Supreme Court meant 
to suggest that its constitution's right to arms guarantee was intended to protect the state's own 
right to possess arms. Such an interpretation reduces the state constitutional guarantee to non-
sense, construing it as if it read: "the state shall not infringe the state's right to keep arms or 
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Implicit in some of these nineteenth-century individual right 
cases is the proposition that even if a militia or "common defense" 
motive is specified for guaranteeing a right, that right is measured by 
the language of the guarantee given, and is not qualified or limited 
in the absence of some specific qualifying language.172 As we shall 
see, other courts and commentators have construed the statement of 
a militia or "common defense" purpose as limiting the kinds of arms 
guaranteed individuals to those commonly used by soldiers.173 Even 
where the right specified is to have a gun for one purpose, however, 
one who lawfully has it for that purpose may properly use it for such 
other purposes as hunting or the defense of his life or another's. 
Some of these nineteenth-century state cases were based upon the 
second amendment in addition to the state constitutional provi-
sion.174 Many of them upheld specific and limited arms controls on 
the ground that, while the right was individual in nature, it included 
only militia-type arms and extended only to carrying them openly, 
not concealed.175 The only flat prohibitions of gun ownership that 
were upheld were laws from the slave states that prohibited guns to 
slaves or fre~ blacks. The reasoning of these cases makes them the 
proverbial exception that proves the rule. Beginning from the uni-
versally accepted individual right premise, these courts reasoned that 
have its militia bear them." The REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMlTIEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 10, at 11, argues that while it is possible to argue that a right to arms provision in 
thefederal constitution was intended to protect the states, it is conceptually absurd to suggest 
that such a provision inserted into a state constitution was intended to protect the state rather 
than individuals. "State bills of rights necessarily protect only against action by the state, and 
by definition a state cannot infringe its own rights; to attempt to protect a right belonging to 
the state by inserting it in a limitation of the state's own powers would create an absurdity." 
172. Hardy & Stompoly, supra note 3, at 76-77, make this argument explicit in regard to 
the second amendment, analogizing to the first amendment's guarantee of a right to assembly. 
Although the motive of allowing the people to petition for redress of grievances is specified in 
the first amendment, the right of assembly has not been construed as strictly limited by that 
statement of motivation. Indeed, it has been extrapolated into a right of association for innu-
merable purposes, of which petitioning for redress of grievances is but an infequently encoun-
tered one. See also Gardiner, supra note 10, at 83. 
173. See, e.g., English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 475 (1872) (quoting 2 J. BISHOP, THE CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 124 (3d ed. 1865)): 
As to its interpretation, if we look to this question in the light of judicial reason, without 
the aid of specific authority, we shall be led to the conclusion that the provision protects 
only the right to "keep" such A'arms" as are used for purposes of war, in distinction from 
those which are employed in quarrels and broils, and fights between maddened individu-
als, since such only are adapted to promote ''the security of a free state." In like manner 
the right to "bear" arms refers merely to the military way of using them, not to their use in 
bravado and affray. 
See also notes 193-94 infra and accompanying text. 
174. E.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); State v. 
Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850); Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394 (1859). 
175. E.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); Aymette v. 
State, 21 Tenn. 154, 2 Hum. 119 (1840). 
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blacks could be denied the right to arms because they were excluded 
by race from all privileges of citizenship.176 Adopting that conclu-
sion in .Dred Scott,171 Mr. Chief Justice Taney offered an argumen-
tum ad horribilis that exemplified the individual right interpretation 
expounded by all the courts and commentators relatively close in 
time to the amendment. Obviously blacks could not be recognized 
as citizens, Taney declared, because then the (to him) salutary 
Southern laws requiring their disarmament could not stand in the 
face of constitutional guarantees of the right to arms.178 
.Dred Scott was apparently the only ante-bellum Supreme Court 
reference to right-to-arms guarantees. Several years after the Civil 
War the Court voided a federal prosecution of private persons for 
attempting to deprive blacks of their newly recognized rights as 
freedmen to assemble and to bear arms.179 Pointing out that only 
private action had been alleged, the Court denied federal jurisdiction 
on the ground that freedom of assembly and the right to arms are 
guaranteed only against congressional infringement. But it obvi-
ously viewed the right to arms as an individual one, stating that the 
amendment leaves "the people to look [to state law] for their protec-
tion against any violation by their fellow citizens" of that right. 180 
Next came Presser v. Illinois,181 in which the petitioner claimed 
that the amendment invalidated laws which prohibited the unli-
censed organization, training and marching of para-military groups. 
The Presser Court responded by stressing the obvious: the subject 
matter of the second amendment is only the right of individuals to 
possess arms; constitutional provisions relating to group arm-bearing 
appear only in article I, sections 8 and 10. Moreover, those provi-
sions refer only to the militia and formal state or federal military 
forces, not to private armies. Thus, the challenged state legislation 
simply did not fall within the amendment's subject matter. The 
Court also noted that, even if the right to arms had been implicated, 
the amendment guarantees it against only the federal government, 
not the states. This was standard nineteenth-century doctrine, based 
on prior holdings that the provisions of the Bill of Rights, standing 
alone, did not apply against the states themselves and were not made 
176. E.g., State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250, 5 Ired. 181 (1844); cf. Cooper v. Mayor of Sa-
vannah, 4 Ga. 68 (1848) (blacks were not citizens). 
177. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 690 (1856). 
178. See 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17. 
179. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
180. 92 U.S. at 553. 
181. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
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applicable by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.182 That the Court rejected a first amendment claim on 
the same nonincorporation grounds emphasizes its implicit individ-
ual right view of the second amendment. Second and fourth amend-
ment challenges were also rejected on that rationale as an additional 
ground in Miller v. Texas .183 In both cases the Court treated the 
second amendment right similarly to first and fourth amendment 
rights, subjecting all three to the contemporary doctrine that individ-
ual rights were protected only against the federal government and 
not against the states. Likewise, in Robertson v. Baldwin the amend-
ment was grouped with the Bill of Rights as a whole in illustrating 
the generalization that rights guaranteed to individuals are neverthe-
less subject to qualifications.184 
United States v. Miller, 185 a 1939 case, is the Supreme Court's 
only extended analysis of the second amendment. Miller arose out 
of a challenge to an early federal gun law. During the decade of 
Prohibition, with its gang wars, and the subsequent depression years 
of John Dillinger and Bonnie and Clyde, sawed-off shotguns and 
submachine guns had become widely identified in the public mind as 
"gangster weapons."186 The National Firearms Act of 1934187 con-
tained various provisions against such weapons, including a prohibi-
tion, which Miller and a confederate were accused of violating, 
against the possession of a sawed-off shotgun that had been trans-
ported in interstate commerce. The defendants successfully moved 
the trial court to void their indictment on the ground that this prohi-
bition violated the second amendment. On the Government's ap-
182. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (denying that the Bill of 
Rights had been made applicable to the states by virtue of the privileges and immunities clause 
of the 14th amendment); Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding 
that the fifth amendment applies only against the federal government, not against the states). 
183. 153 U.S. 535 (1894). Although this case and its predecessors represent a doctrine 
which has long been superseded by the concept of selective incorporation, see, e.g., Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial), extended analysis of these 
cases is required if only to correct the extraordinary way in which they have sometimes been 
read in relation to the second amendment. For instance, J. ALVIANI & W. DRAKE, supra note 
2, at 9, cite the Miller v. Texas line of cases as evidence that ''the Second Amendment does not 
guarantee a personal right to own firearms. . . . Personal self protection was never an issue in 
the adoption of the Second Amendment." In fact, nothing to support that interpretation will 
be found anywhere in those cases. Nor does it at all follow from their doctrine that the Bill of 
Rights applies only against the federal government. On the incorporation issue, see notes 206-
32 infra and accompanying text. 
184. 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897). 
185. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
186. See L. KENNE'IT & J. ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 202-03. 
187. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934). L. KENNE'IT & J. ANDERSON, 
supra note 23, at 204-12, extensively discuss the history of the Act's provisions. 
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peal, the Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the defendants 
had merely attacked the indictment (and, therefore, the statute) on 
its face, without any attempt at a factual demonstration that sawed-
off shotguns were the kind of weapons contemplated by the amend-
ment. The Court followed the reasoning of those nineteenth- cen-
tury courts and commentators who construed the right to arms as 
individual but applicable only to those weapons commonly used for 
militia purposes: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use 
of any "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" 
at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well reg~ated militia, we cannot say that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. 
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of 
the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the 
common defense.Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys (Tenn.) 154, 158.188 
This holding has been widely misunderstood, most surpisingly by 
proponents of the individual right position. They have even gone so 
far as to denigrate its authority by pointing out that it was rendered 
on the basis of only the Government's one-sided briefing.189 Addi-
tionally, critics have attacked what they suppose to be the opinion's 
factual basis, pointing out that shotguns were used by regular troops 
in World War I and Vietnam, and by guerrillas, commandos, and so 
on in World War II and other twentieth-century confilcts.190 
Equally surprising, state's right proponents have acclaimed the 
opinion. Ignoring the fact that its holding focuses entirely on the 
weapon, they have emphasized its language linking the amendment's 
purpose to the "militia": ''With obvious purpose to assure the con-
tinuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces the 
declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It 
must be interpreted and applied with that end in view."191 But this 
statement, which appears at approximately the median point of the 
opinion, in fact repudiates the state's right argument when read in 
the context of what the Court indicated "the militia" to be. The en-
suing half of the opinion is given over to exhaustive citations of orig-
inal and secondary sources that demonstrated to the Court that: 
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the de-
188. 307 U.S. at 178; see also note 173 supra. 
189. See, e.g., Caplan,supra note 10, at44-48; Gardiner,supra note 10, at 88. Having been 
released by the trial court, the defendants filed no brief on appeal, but simply disappeared into 
the criminal milieu from which they had involuntarily surfaced. 
190. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942); Black, From Trenches to 
Squad Cars, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1982, at 30, 72-73. 
191. 307 U.S. at 178. 
November 1983] The Second Amendment 249 
bates in the [Constitutional] Convention, the history and legislation of 
Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. 
These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physi-
cally capable of acting in concert for the common defense ... [a]nd 
further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were ex-
pected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in 
common use at the time. 192 
Perhaps Miller has been so misunderstood by zealous partisans 
because it steers an almost perfect middle course between today's 
contending extremes - those who claim that the amendment guar-
antees nothing to individuals versus those who claim that its guaran-
tee is unlimited. Far from upholding the state's right position, the 
Court clearly recognized that the defendants could claim the amend-
ment's protection as individuals, and that, in doing so, they need not 
prove themselves members of some formal military unit like the Na-
tional Guard.193 At the same time the Court's focus on the weapon 
192. 307 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added). The real difficulty with Miller's flawed militia-
centric interpretation is not that it diminishes the individual right approach, but that it tends to 
exaggerate to absurdity the extent of the right afforded. Miller's concentration on militia-type 
weaponry has sometimes been taken as suggesting the unwelcome conclusion that private citi-
zens have a guaranteed right to own all the mass destructive weaponry of sophisticated mod-
em warfare, from tanks and rocket launchers to ICBMs and nuclear devices. When the 
amendment's other two purposes of personal self-defense and law enforcement are recognized, 
however, it becomes possible to conclude that the guarantee applies only to such military-type 
small arms as can reasonably be used also in law enforcement and civilian self defense. See 
notes 238-41 infra and accompanying text. 
193. Although the opinion contains no such language, its flawed militia-centric rationale 
plausibly leads to the conclusion that the amendment right is limited to the military-aged male 
population, which makes up the constitutional militia. Such a limitation ill accords with the 
amendment's intention and text, however. See notes 53-54 supra. Nor does it follow Miller's 
axis of limitation, which revolves around the question of what kind of arms are by right pro-
tected, rather than what individuals enjoy that right. The court probably eschewed any discus-
sion of the latter question as unnecessary because the defendants, being adult male citizens, 
were presumptively members of the constitutional militia. 
If Miller is confined strictly to its facts, it goes no further than implicitly recognizing that 
the home possession of firearms by one who is presumptively a member of the constitutional 
militia preserves the efficiency thereof under modem conditions. Such a view follows from 
current military thinking that considers militiamen as a resource only for times of dire neces-
sity, e.g., keeping order when both the Army and the federalized National Guard have been 
co=itted overseas and/or in the aftermath of an atomic attack. Given that the very circum-
stances which require the calling up of militiamen today may also preclude their drawing arms 
from centralized armories, their home possession of arms facilitates militia service today no 
less than in the 18th century. Moreover, the home possession of firearms by potential militia 
members would presumably facilitate familiarity with at least those weapons. To be able to 
call upon a cadre of people already familiar with weapons (particularly those weapons they 
would actually be using) would seem particulary important for the militia today, in the ab-
sence of a compulsory training requirement like those that existed in the 18th century. See text 
at note 49 supra. 
Significantly, home and/or individual possession of firearms is the rule today in nations 
like Israel and Switzerland, which continue to rely substantially upon the militia concept. In 
Switzerland, every man of military age is required to keep a fully automatic assault rifle (or, if 
an officer, a pistol) in his home, along with a=unition; and the shooting sports are strongly 
encouraged for the entire population. C. GREENWOOD, supra note 44, at 4; J. STEINBERG, 
WHY SWITZERLAND? ch. 6 (1976). In Israel, voluntary ownership of firearms is encouraged for 
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suggests rational limitations on the kinds of arms that the amend-
ment guarantees to individuals. Such arms must be both of the kind 
in "common use" at the present time and provably "part of the ordi-
nary military equipment."194 Those who have accused the Court of 
factual inaccuracy have simply misunderstood its legal conclusion as 
a finding of fact. Miller does not characterize shotguns ( or even 
sawed-off shotguns) as outside the amendment's protection per se. 
Miller rests on the obvious proposition that it is not judicially notice-
able, in the absence of factual proof, that sawed-off shotguns are "in 
common use" and form ''part of. the ordinary military equip-
ment."195 The Miller Court therefore returned the case to the trial 
court, where the defendants could have attempted the unenviable 
feat of demonstrating that sawed-off shotguns fell within the limiting 
criteria that Miller enunciated as defining the weaponry protected by 
the amendment.196 
Miller is the Supreme Court's first and last extended treatment of 
the second amendment. This may seem surprising in light of the 
amount of legislation which the previous twenty-five years had seen 
on this controversial subject. But federal law has never gone beyond 
denying firearms to criminals, the mentally unstable and juveniles. 
Nor, until recently, has any state or local jurisdiction attempted to 
deny responsible adults the possession of firearms for lawful pur-
poses. So the cases have involved only various provisions of the fed-
eral Gun Control Act of 1968. Challenges to these under the 
amendment have been summarily rejected by lower federal courts. 
Typical, and often repeated, are observations to the effect that "there 
is no showing that prohibiting possession of firearms by felons," the 
mentally unsound, children, or narcotics addicts "obstructs the 
maintenance of a 'well regulated militia.' " 197 
In 1981, Morton Grove, Illinois, banned the civilian possession of 
the entire population, while the government has donated firearms to kibbutzim and other 
farming villages in areas likely to be subject to terrorist or military attack. Reservists are 
encouraged to carry their submachine guns or assault rifles with them at all times, particularly 
when traveling on the public streets. See Bruce-Briggs, supra note 9, at 56-57; Order by Israel 
Puts Even More Guns on Street, L.A. Times, July 5, 1978, at 1, col. 3. 
194. On the limitations of the individual right, see notes 235-71 infra and accompanying 
text. 
195. See text accompanying note 188 supra. As to standards for judicial notice, see gener-
ally C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 687; 9 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 
§§ 2565-83 (1940). 
196. On the applicability of these criteria to handguns, see notes 239-40 infra and accom-
panying text. 
197. United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 
404 U.S. 1009 (1972);seealso United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 948 (1976). 
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handguns, 198 thus becoming the only American jurisdiction to have 
attempted the confiscation of a common form of civilian armament 
since the Civil War.199 The district court rejected a second amend-
ment challenge to that ordinance without endorsing or accepting 
either the state's right or the individual right interpretation.200 It felt 
bound by Presser and other nineteenth-century holdings that the 
amendment was inapplicable against the states. Many state courts 
have also endorsed this proposition in rejecting second amendment 
challenges.201 
A few state or federal cases have gone beyond upholding gun 
laws on these limited grounds, or those suggested in Miller, to em-
brace the exclusively state's right viewpoint.202 At least one of these 
cases, holding that the amendment provides for no individual right, 
expressly divorces itself from Miller. 203 But a number of other such 
cases actually cite Miller as their authority.204 This is startling in 
light of the inconsistency between their usage of "militia" as a par-
ticular military force and Miller's exhaustive exposition of the eight-
eenth-century definition of "militia" as comprising "all [militarily 
capable] males . . . bearing arms supplied by themselves."205 
198. Morton Grove ordinance 81-11. In 1982 the cities of San Francisco and Berkeley, 
California, followed suit, but their ordinances were quickly invalidated on state statutory 
grounds. Doe v. City and County of San Francisco, 136 Ca. App. 3d 509, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 
(1982). 
199. In 1861 the secessionist legislature of Tennessee ordered the confiscation of all fire-
arms. This was intended both to disarm the state's substantial Unionist minority and to gather 
arms for the Confederates. See Moon, A Brief Historical Note on Gun Control in Tennessee, 82 
CASE & CoM. 38 (1977). The enactment was declared unconstitutional shortly after the war's 
end. Smith v. Ishenhour, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 214 (1866). Detailed discussions of the history of 
American firearms legislation, both state and federal, appear in L. KENNETT & J. ANDERSON, 
supra note 23, ch. 8, and Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, 
in REsTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 6. 
200. See Quilici v. Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. 111. 1981), ajfd, 695 F.2d 261 
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1822). 
201. E.g., Galvan v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1969); 
State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166 (La. 1977); Hardison v. State, 84 Nev. 125, 437 P.2d 868 (1968); 
Harris v. State, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967); Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 426 
(1967), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969). 
202. E.g., United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); Stevens v. United 
States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971), Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); 
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 
(1943). 
203. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942). 
204. See Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 52 
U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1822); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 
(10th Cir. 1977); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971). 
205. 307 U.S. at 179; see text accompanying notes 35-56 & 191-93 supra. 
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III. ON THE QUESTION OF INCORPORATION AGAINST THE STATES 
The discussion thus far has focused almost entirely upon the sec-
ond amendment as a restraint upon federal governmental activity. 
The cases just mentioned suggest that state or municipal regulation 
is not within the scope of the amendment. As a practical matter, 
however, although the kind of prohibitionary-confiscatory legisla-
tion that the amendment forbids,206 has been proposed at the federal 
level, it has never come close to enactment there. Nor does this seem 
likely in the foreseeable future.207 From time to time, a few states 
have enacted legislation which could conceivably be subject to sec-
ond amendment objection,2°8 but in recent years legislative activity 
raising questions central to the second amendment has been limited 
to the municipal level. The most drastic example is the complete 
prohibition on home possession of handguns recently enacted by 
Morton Grove, Illinois.209 This legislation clearly raises the question 
of whether the amendment should be considered incorporated 
against state and local governments through the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. 
The numerous cases citing Presser v. Illinois and Miller v. Texas 
for the proposition that the amendment is not incorporated210 cannot 
survive rigorous analysis. The Presser/Miller view derives from a 
concept of federalism (f.e., that civil liberties are guaranteed only 
against the federal government and that their infringement by the 
states is not the business of the federal judiciary) that has long been 
206. See notes 235-41 infta and accompanying text. 
207. H.R. 40, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H32 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981), intro-
duced by Representatives Bingham and Yates, would have completely prohibited the home 
possession of handguns by civilians. It was apparently never introduced into the Senate and 
was not expected to pass out of committee even in the House of Representatives. Back in 1972 
a more modest bill, which would have prohibited new sales of nonsporting handguns (but not 
confiscated those already in circulation), passed the Senate, but failed to pass the House. This 
bill represents the high water mark for prohibitionist legislation. 
208. Compare 1886-1887 Ala. Acts No. 4 § 17; 1881 Ark. Acts ch. 96 § 3; 1901 S.C. Acts 
No. 435; 1879 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 96 (banning the sale of "Saturday night special" •type pis-
tols), with 1923 Ark. Acts No. 430, § l; 1933-34 Hawaii Sess. Laws ch. 26, § 3; 1925 Mich. Pub. 
Acts No. 313; 1921 Mo. Laws f 69,691 § 3; 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 195; 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 
197, § I; 1913 Or. Laws ch. 256, § I (requiring permits for the sale and/or ownership of pis-
tols). Most of these laws appear to have been at least partially motivated by desire to deny 
access to firearms to racial or ethnic minorities and political dissenters. Whether in repudia-
tion of these purposes or for other reasons, the Oregon, Arkansas, Tennessee and Alabama 
laws have been repealed. See Kates, supra note 11, at 14-22. Minnesota and Illinois have 
recently passed laws aimed at prohibiting the sale of "Saturday Night specials" variously de• 
fined. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-3(g) (Smith-Hurd 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 624-716 
(West Supp. 1983). For a discussion of this legislation and its validity within the second 
amendment, see note 240 infta and accompanying text. 
209. See note 198 supra. 
210. See note 201 supra. 
November 1983) The Second Amendment 253 
discredited.211 Moreover, strictly speaking, the suggestion that 
Presser v. Illinois and Miller v. Texas reject due process incorpora-
tion misreads the actual holdings in those cases. What they literally 
held was only that the Bill of Rights did not apply against the states 
ab initio and was not incorporated against them by the privileges and 
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Presumably the at-
titude toward federalism which led the nineteenth-century Court to 
reject privileges and immunities incorporation would equally have 
led it to reject due process incorporation, if anyone had then 
imagined it.212 But to apply the Presser/Miller reasoning to negate 
due process incorporation of the second amendment today is to ex-
tend those cases beyond their holdings. However logical that exten-
sion might have seemed in 1886, it is absurd today when the result 
would be to contradict the entire doctrinal basis of modem incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights against state and local govemment.213 
Absent the misleading spectre of Presser and Miller, the weak-
ness of the argument against application of the second amendment 
211. Compare Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) ("[l]t is well-settled that the restric-
tions of the [second and fourth] amendments operate only on the Federal power and have no 
reference whatever to proceedings in state courts."); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) 
("[T]he [second] amendment is a limitation only upon ... the National government, and not 
upon ... the States."), with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-50 (1968) ("[M]any of the 
rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments . . . have been held to be protected against 
state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Mapp v. Ohio 367 
U.S. 643, 650-55 (1961) (holding the fourth amendment search and seizure protections applica-
ble to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (holding the first amendment freedom of speech binding on the state through the four-
teenth amendment); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) ("it is possible that some of 
the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against the N,ational action may 
also be safeguarded against state action"). 
212. Due process incorporation's first appearance in a Supreme Court case appears to be as 
a dictum in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). See note 211 supra. 
213. Presser does, however, contain a far-reaching, but little noted, dictum suggesting that 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 and 16 proscribes state or local wholesale arms prohibitions or 
confiscation. In the Presser court's view, cl. 15 envisions an armed citizenry which Congress is 
empowered to call forth whenever necessary to execute the laws, suppress rebellions or repel 
invasion. A state would directly infringe that congressional prerogative if it prohibits firearms 
possession by the constitutional militia, ie., the military-age male populace. As the court 
stated: 
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved 
military force or reserve militia of the United States as well of the States, and, in view of 
this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States 
cannot, even laying the [second amendment] out of view, prohibit the people from keep-
ing and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for 
maintaining the public security and disable the people from performing their duty to the 
general government. 
116 U.S. at 265. Authorities indicating the continued importance of an armed citizenry for 
militia duty are reviewed at notes 283-84 infra. Militia considerations might not, however, 
preclude legislation against the possession, ownership, sale or manufacture of "Saturday Night 
Special" •type firearms that are unfit for military or police duty. See note 240 infra and accom-
panying text. 
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to the states is evident. In deciding whether a provision of the Bill of 
Rights is so fundamental as to justify incorporation, the Supreme 
Court has traditionally employed two criteria: The extent to which 
the right is rooted in our Anglo-American common law heritage, as 
well as its Greek and Roman antecedents;214 and how highly the 
Founders themselves valued the right.215 The great esteem in which 
the Founders held the right to arms has already been exhaustively 
detailed. Familiar to them in their own colonial law,216 derived 
from the earliest known English legal codes,217 the right to arms was 
in their day hailed as not only fundamental to their English legal 
and political heritage, but implicit in the (to them) premier and sem-
inal natural law right of self-defense.218 Likewise the right to keep 
personal arms was so fundamental a part of Graeco-Roman law that 
every commentator known to the Founders proclaimed it the basis of 
republican institutions and popular liberty.219 
Above and beyond the general criteria which normally govern 
incorporation is the question of specific legislative intent. There is 
ample evidence that the authors of the fourteenth amendment actu-
ally intended to protect the right to arms from state or local interfer-
ence. The quantum of that evidence considerably exceeds the 
evidence that they intended to protect any of the rights which have 
heretofore received incorporation. The fourteenth amendment was 
enacted at a time when the Republicans were still utterly dominant 
in Congress by reason of their continuing exclusion of the delega-
tions of the southern states. Section 1 goes virtually unmentioned in 
the debate on the fourteenth amendment - beyond the statement of 
Representative Thaddeus Stevens that it was intended to constitu-
tionalize the underlying principles of the immediately preceding 
1866 Civil Rights Act,220 thereby placing them beyond repeal upon 
214. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (protection of double jeopardy 
held fundamental), Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968) (right to jury trial funda-
mental); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225-26 (1967) (right to speedy trial funda-
mental); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (right to counsel fundamental). 
215. See, e.g. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967). 
216. See notes 46-48, 156 supra and accompanying text. 
217. Professor Whisker finds references to, or recognition of, the right in pre-Norman law, 
back to the period before the reign of Alfred the Great (871-899) when England was divided 
into various kingdoms. See J. WHISKER, OUR VANISHING FREEDOM: THE RIGHT To KEEP 
AND BEAR ARMs 3 (1973) (citing the 602 Code of Ethelbert of Kent and a circa 650 law of 
Edric of Kent). The Laws of Canute (reigned 1016-1035) imposed a fine on anyone who ille-
gally disarmed a subject. 
218. See notes 109, 111 & 153 supra and accompanying text. 
219. See text at notes 114-28 supra. 
220. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
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the southern delegations' retum.221 It is therefore to the 1866 Act 
that we must tum to understand the purposes of section one of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
The principle underlying the 1866 Civil Rights Act was nothing 
less than the repudiation of the whole juridical basis of southern 
slavery. Under the legal theory of slavery, blacks were not human 
beings, but intelligent livestock, incapable of possessing property or 
of having a right to defend it or themselves.222 Pursuant to this the-
ory, .Dred Scott and various preceding southern court decisions had 
declared blacks incapable of citizenship and upheld legislation 
against their possessing arms.223 The 1866 Act in effect overruled 
221. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2459 (1866). See generally Frank & Munro, Tlze 
Original Understanding of Equal Protection of the Laws, 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131, 141 (1950). 
Although the drafting of the amendment was a joint effort by a number of Republicans, of 
whom Stevens was the most prominent, the assignment of its introduction to Rep. Bingham, 
(R-Ohio) further demonstrates its relationship to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which had passed 
a few weeks earlier. Bingham had opposed that Act, not out of any fundamental disagreement 
with its provisions, but because he believed them to exceed federal constitutional authority 
under the thirteenth amendment. By constitutionalizing the basic principles of the 1866 Act, 
the fourteenth amendment removed the danger, of which the Republicans were highly cogni-
zant after Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 690 (1856), that the Act might be over-
turned by the Supreme Court. Fairman, JJoes the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill 
of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). Indeed, in advocating the fourteenth amendment's en-
actment, one prominent Republican complained that southern courts were declaring the 1866 
Act unconstitutional - and enforcing laws banning guns for freedmen. CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3210 (1866) (statement of George W. Julian). 
222. Kates, Abolition, JJeportation, Integration: Altitudes Toward Slavery in the Early Re-
public, 53 J. NEGRO HlsT. 33, 37 & n.25 (1968): 
The majesty and consistency of [ante-bellum] American law uniformly regarded slaves 
as property, incapable of possessing a cognizable interest in personal security. Within this 
theory the rape or murder of a slave was no more than a crime against property-and no 
crime at all if committed by the master. 
By constitutional, statutory, decisional, administrative and customary law the position 
of the slave was fixed. He could not possess arms or liquor, make contracts, own land or 
personalty, travel freely, give testimony or serve as a juror or in any other public office, 
learn to read or write, act independently as a religious leader, intermarry with whites, 
compete in the free labor market-above all, he had no political rights. The prohibitions 
of arms, liquor and travel were enforced by a more or less well organized system of special 
and general searches and night patrols of the posse comitatus. Justice to the slave was, 
within the law or within its enforcement, summarily meted out by masters, possemen and 
judicial officials alike. As Mr. Chief Justice Taney succinctly expressed it: "[the Negro 
slave had] no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 690, 701 (1856) (footnote omitted). 
223. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text. Conversely, abolitionist legal trea-
tises had offered as plain evidence of the unconstitutionality of slavery the fact that its legal 
theory abridged the second amendment right of blacks to keep arms. See, e.g., L. SPOONER, 
THE UNCONSTlTUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 98 (1860); J. TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE UNCON· 
STITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 117-18 (1849) (reprinted 1969). Since these commentaries pro-
vided the legal underpinnings for the constitutional thought of the Radical (and moderate) 
Republicans of 1866, they are of particular significance for understanding the scope of the 
fourteenth amendment. See J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 125 (1965) (originally pub-
lished as THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT); Graham, Tlze Early 
Antislavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WIS. L. REv. 479. 
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Dred Scott224 as an adjunct to its general purpose of immutably con-
ferring upon blacks legal standing as free citizens.225 In so doing it 
implicity conferred upon them the right of arms under the second 
amendment. As we have seen, central to the idea of freedom and 
citizenship in Anglo-American law and philosophy were the rights to 
personal security and property, to self defense - and to the posses-
sion of arms for those purposes. 226 
Moreover, it appears that proscribing anti-gun laws was ex-
pressly contemplated by the authors of the 1866 Act and fourteenth 
amendment. The betes noir of the Congress of 1866 were the Black 
Codes that had immediately spewed from the all-white southern leg-
islatures after Appomattox. These Codes sought to reduce the new 
freedman to peonage, perpetuating against him all the legal disabili-
ties which had previously characterized his status as a slave. As the 
Special Report of the Anti-Slavery Conference of 1867 noted, among 
the most obnoxious provisions of these Codes were those by which 
blacks were "forbidden to own or bear firearms," as they had been 
under slavery, "and thus were rendered defenseless against assaults" 
by their former masters or other whites.227 Congressman after con-
gressman, including the Senate sponsors of both the 1866 Act and 
the fourteenth amendment, expressed their outrage at the denial of 
the freedman's right to arms.228 In summarizing what the 1866 Act 
would accomplish, its House and Senate sponsors cited Blackstone's 
classification of the "absolute rights of individuals", stating that 
these were the essential human rights being conveyed.229 Finally, 
myriad statements and an official committee report in relation to the 
anti-KKK legislation enacted in 187!230 shows an unchallenged as-
224. Dred Scott is overruled by§ I of the 1866 Act, supra note 220, which declares "that all 
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not 
taxed, are ... citizens of the Unites States." This clause was adopted later as the first sentence 
of the fourteenth amendment. 
225. Stating that its purpose was to guarantee the former slaves the rights inherent in their 
new status, both the House and the Senate sponsors of the 1866 Act quoted Chancellor Kent's 
listing of the rights of a free person: " 'the right of personal security, the right of personal 
liberty and the right to acquire and enjoy property.' " CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1118 & 1757 (1866) (statements of Rep. Wilson and Sen. Trumbull) (quoting 2 J. KENT, COM-
MENTARIES I {New York 1827)). 
226. See notes 109-11 & 117-18 supra and accompanying text. 
227. Reprinted in H. HYMAN, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 217 
(1967). See generally E. COULTER, THE SOUTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 40 
n.43 (1947); w. Du BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167, 172, 223 (1962). 
228. See Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. 
MASON U. L. REV. I, 21-25 (1981). 
229. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 225, at 1115-18; text accompanying note 153 s1q,ra. 
230. Legislation designed to enforce the fourteenth amendment, and in particular to sup-
press the KKK was introduced in 1871. CONGRESSIONAL GLOBLE, 42d Cong., Isl Sess. 174 
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sumption by a Congress largely identical in personnel to that of 1866 
that the fourteenth amendment they had enacted five years earlier 
encompassed second amendment rights.231 
In sum, the only viable justification for denying incorporation of 
the second amendment against the states today is the exclusively 
state's right view that the amendment does not confer an individual 
right. If the amendment only guaranteed a right of the states it 
would be self contradictory to incorporate it into the fourteenth 
amendment.232 But as this state's right interpretation of the amend-
ment is itself not viable historically, it therefore follows that the sec-
ond amendment should be held applicable to the states through the 
due process clause of the fourteenth. 
IV. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
AND THE PROPER SCOPE OF GUN CONTROL 
Recognizing that the amendment guarantees an individual right 
applicable against both federal and state governments by no means 
forecloses all gun control options. Gun control advocates must, 
however, come to grips with the limitations imposed by the amend-
ment - just as advocates of increasing police powers to deal with 
crime must come to grips with the limitations imposed by the fourth, 
fifth and sixth amendments. As with those amendments, determin-
ing what limitations the second imposes will require detailed exami-
nation of its colonial and common law antecedents. 233 The phrase 
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms," so opaque to us, was 
apparently self-defining to the Founders, who used it baldly and 
(1871) (Introduced as "an act to protect loyal and peaceable citizens in the South .... ", H.R. 
No. 189). Passed as the Enforcement Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Section 1 of the legislation sur-
vfves as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See Halbrook, supra note 228, at 25 n.141, 27 n.146 and 
accompanying text. 
231. See Halbrook, supra note 228, at 25-28. For the relationship between the two Acts 
and the personnel of the two Congresses which enacted them, see Kates, Immunity of State 
Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 
615, 621-23 (1970). 
232. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 455 (2d ed. 
1983); see also note 171 supra. 
233. Cf. Payton Y. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 593-96 (1980) (interpreting fourth amendment 
by reference to a combination of materials including Coke's Institutes, pre-colonial case law, 
and American colonial co=entary and practice); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 
(1969) (guarantee against double jeopardy construed by reference to Blackstone both as an 
authority on pre-colonial English practice and as the guide followed by the colonists in estab-
lishing American legal principles); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (right to 
jury trial defined by reference to Blackstone, as well as to independent evidence of American 
colonial and preceding English legal practice); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-25 
(1967) (right to speedy trial defined by reference to Coke and English legal practice back to the 
Magna Carta). 
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without any attempt to define it. Presumably they felt that clarifica-
tion was unnecessary because they were constitutionalizing a pre-
existing right to arms whose parameters they knew under their colo-
nial law and practice as it had developed out of the early English 
common law.234 
The remainder of this Article is devoted to sketching out some of 
the amendment's implications in relation to a few of the more com-
monly encountered "gun control" proposals. The intention is not to 
resolve definitively the constitutionality of any of these, much less of 
the entire gamut of possible control options, but only to outline some 
relevant lines of inquiry. 
A. Limitations on the Right of the General Citizenry To "Keep" 
Weapons 
The preceding sections of this Article demonstrate that, in gen-
eral, the second amendment guarantees individuals a right to "keep" 
weapons in the home for self defense.735 Several limitations on this 
234. This is not to suggest that the meaning will be as readily understandable to us or as 
easily applied, particularly as to control proposals or options that bear little resemblance to 
those with which the Founders were familiar. Indeed, it will not be easy to determine even 
what control options were familiar to them outside of those commonly embraced by colonial 
law, see note 156 supra, the early common law principles set out by English commentators, see 
note 153 supra, and the absolute prohibition of the 1671 Game Act and the other Stuart arms 
confiscation devices, see notes 135-39 supra and accompanying text. It is difficult if not impos-
sible to determine precisely what knowledge the Founders had of English arms controls con-
temporary to their own time. In general, Americans seem to have believed the contemporary 
English law (or practice) far more restrictive than their colonial law or the original common 
law and Madison and Tucker found the exception-riddled English Bill of Rights guarantee 
insufficient. See notes 144 & 155 supra. In view of these real or perceived differences, the 
amendment cannot be slavishly construed with reference to contemporary English law. As 
with any constitutional guarantee whose "historic roots are in English history," it nevertheless 
"must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American 
constitutional scheme of government rather than the English . . . ." United States v. Brewster, 
408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). On the debate over the relevance of original intent in determining 
constitutional rights, see note 28 supra. 
235. See notes 53-64 & 192-95 supra and accompanying text. G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRJNO, 
supra note 13, at 255, suggests that the 1671 Game Act's prohibition of firearms ownership to 
all but the high nobility demonstrates that the common law right to arms did not apply to 
firearms. By the same token, reference might be made to a series of statutes of Henry VIII 
which prohibited both gun and crossbow ownership by commoners. See REPORT OF THE Sun-
COMMITIEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 12 nn.9-12. Incredible as it may seem, 
the primary rationale for these Henrician prohibitions (explicitly avowed in all five statutes) 
was that crossbow and gun possession was distracting Englishmen from their legally required 
ownership of, and arduous regular practice with, the long bow, which was still thought of as 
vitally necessary to English military defense. A secondary purpose (several times avowed) was 
that the "king's dere" were being "distroyd" by crossbow or gun-armed poachers. A tertiary 
concern (mentioned in only one of the five enactments) was to prevent the misuse of these 
weapons in crime. Id at 1-2. 
It is difficult to see any of this Henrician legislation playing an affirmative part in the 
colonial right-to-arms tradition upon which the amendment is based. In all probability the 
Founders were entirely ignorant that the Henrician legislation had ever existed. The anachro-
nism of its principal purpose having become evident by the latter part of Henry's reign, he 
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right have already been suggested, however. First and foremost are 
those implicit in United States v. Miller, suggesting that the amend-
ment protects only such arms as are (1) "of the kind in common use" 
among law-abiding people and (2) provably "part of the ordinary 
military equipment" today.236 The analysis presented throughout 
this Article indicates that the "ordinary military equipment" crite-
rion is infected by Miller's conceptually fl.awed concentration on the 
amendment's militia purpose, to the exclusion of its other objectives. 
Decisions recognizing that concerns for individual self-protection 
and for law enforcement also underlie right to arms guarantees in-
volve at once greater historical fidelity and more rigorous limitation 
upon the kinds of arms protected. These decisions suggest that only 
such arms as have utility for all three purposes and are lineally de-
scended from the kinds of arms the Founders knew fall within the 
amendment's guarantee.237 Reformulating Miller's dual test in this 
way produces a triple test that anyone claiming the amendment's 
protection must satisfy as to the particular weapon he owns. That 
weapon must provably be (1) "of the kind in common use" among 
law-abiding people today; (2) useful and appropriate not just for 
military purposes, but also for law enforcement and individual self-
defense, and (3) lineally descended from the kinds of weaponry 
known to the Founders. 
This triple test resolves the ad ahsurdum and ad horrihilus results 
(to which Miller's sketchy and fl.awed militia-centric discussion 
greatly contributed) sometimes viewed as :fl.owing from an individual 
right interpretation of the amendment.238 Handguns, for example, 
repealed the legislation by proclamation - more than 65 years before the settlement of the 
American colonies and over 200 before Madison's birth. Id Doubtless the Founders were 
familiar with the 1671 Act since its repudiation had been one of the purposes of the arms 
guarantee in the English Bill of Rights. But the only relevance that execrated Act had to the 
Founders' thought was as a model of what the second amendment was intended to foreclose. 
See notes 137-51 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, legally speaking, neither the 
Henrician legislation nor the 1671 Game Act could have formed any part of the colonial law 
on arms. They were excluded by the inapplicability principle as they were clearly not suited to 
colonial conditions. See note 155 supra. Such legislation was wholly inconsistent with the 
arms policy upon which both Britain and the Colonies had operated from the colonies' incep-
tion. This policy, see notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text, called for the colonists to arm 
themselves for self defense rather than burdening or depending upon the remote military re-
sources of the mother country. The weapons with which they were to be armed expressly 
included "pistols." Yet these would plainly have been forbidden had the Henrician legislation 
been considered applicable. See the colonial statutes cited at notes 46-48 supra. 
236. See notes 188, 192-96 supra and accompanying text. 
237. See People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537,541,235 N.W. 245, 246-47 (1931);see also· State 
v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 364-66, 614 P.2d 94, 98-100 (1980); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458 
(1875) (construing state constitutions). 
238. See, e.g., Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (arguing that, since 
any and all weapons have proved useful in modem (particularly guerrilla) warfare, Miller's 
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clearly fall within the amendment's protection. That handguns are 
per se "in common use" among law-abiding people and combine 
utility for civilian, police and military activities is not only provable 
but judicially noticeable.239 On the other hand, such a factual dem-
onstration would be difficult as to at least some of the weapons com-
monly denominated "Saturday Night Specials."240 Legislation 
selectively prohibiting them might, therefore, be consistent with the 
amendment. Gangster weapons like brass knuckles, blackjacks, 
sandbags, switchblade knives and sawed-off shotguns unquestiona-
bly can be prohibited since they fail to meet both the "common use" 
and tripartite appropriateness branches of the test. The possession of 
militia-centric rationale provides no viable limit on the kinds of arms guaranteed by the 
amendment); Royko, Machine Guns .Don't Kill People Kill, Chi. Sun Times, Dec. 19, 1981, at 
2, col. 1; cf. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.) (reasoning that the amendment 
does not guarantee an individual right to possess machine guns because, if it did, there would 
be no limit to the kinds of weaponry embraced in the right), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); 
J. WHISKER,supra note 217, at 112-13 (arguing that since bazookas, cannon, and the like have 
never been used by criminals or terrorists in this country, and since such weapons are generally 
too heavy, bulky and expensive to operate for criminals or terrorists, government should not 
deny the law-abiding citizen's "right" to own, for instance, "a 20 mm. recoiless rifle simply for 
his own pleasure and perhaps to shoot ten times a year in a deserted part of the country"). 
239. As to the commonality of the handgun, exclusive of militarily-owned weapons, the 
American gun stock was estimated in 1981 as including not less than 54 million handguns. 
Kates, supra note 17, at n.2 and accompanying text (unpaginated manuscript). In general, a 
broad range of large-caliber, high-quality handguns combine suitability for military, law en-
forcement and civilian self-defense uses. Indeed, the vast majority of such weapons commonly 
sold to civilians in the United States for self-defense were specifically developed for the mili-
tary and/or police market (or are the lineal descendants of models that were so developed). 
See, e.g., A. BRISTOW, THE SEARCH FOR AN EFFECTIVE POLICE HANDGUN (1971); M. JOSSER-
AND & J. STEVENSON, PlsTOLS, REVOLVERS AND AMMUNmON, ch. 7 (1967); w. SMITH, 
SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD, chs. 10-12 (J. Smith 9th ed. 1960). The military /police origin of 
these weapons is often evidenced by their current designations: Smith and Wesson model IO 
("Military and Police"), and models 36, 37 and 60 ("Chiefs Special" - regular, airweight and 
stainless); Colt "Government Model" (.45 ACP), "Lawman," and "Trooper'' (.357 magnum), 
"Official Police," "Police Positive," "Detective Special," and "Agent" (.38 special). The ori-
gins and designations of imported handguns are similar: Walther PP and PPK (the initials 
stand for German police organizations), the standard weapon of the German Luftwaffe during 
World War II; Star "Guardia Civil"; and Webley RI.C. ("Royal Irish Constabulary"). Even 
those handguns which are not specifically designed with military and/or police use in mind are 
designed, manufactured and operate in manners closely analogous, or identical, to those used 
by the police or military forces of various nations. See, e.g., id. at 58-93, 159-92. Indeed, a 
substantial proportion of the civilian gun stock consists of former military weapons, captured 
in warfare or kept by veterans as souvenirs. The Comptroller General has estimated that 8.8 
million ''war trophies" returned from World War II alone. GOVERNMEN1' ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, HANDGUN CONTROL: EFFECTIVENESS AND COST 17-18 (1978). 
240. "Saturday Night Special" is the derisive name for a more or less distinct subspecies of 
handgun, identified primarily by inexpensiveness, small size and low quality of manufacture 
and metallurgy. See McClain, "Saturday Night Special" Gun Regulation: A Feasible Policy 
Option?, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note 10. Twentieth-century countries have rarely if 
ever adopted as standard handguns for military and/or police purposes those of less than .32 
caliber; the weapons they standardize tend to be relatively large and heavy and very well 
made. See A. BRISTOW, supra note 239; I. HOGG & J. WEEKS, MILITARY SMALL ARMS OF THE 
20TH CENTURY (4th ed. 1981); J. OWEN, BRASSEY'S INFANTRY WEAPONS OF THE WORLD, 
1950-1975; W. SMITH, supra note 239. 
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billy clubs is clearly protected, but mace or similar chemical spray 
weapons would not be unless they can be shown to be lineally de-
scended from some form of weapon known to the Founders. Like-
wise, the amendment does not protect the possession of fully 
automatic weapons, grenades, rocket launchers, flame throwers, ar-
tillery pieces, tanks, nuclear devices, and so on. Although such so-
phisticated devices of modem warfare do have military utility, they 
are not also useful for law enforcement or for self-protection, nor are 
they commonly possessed by law-abiding individuals. Moreover, 
many of them may not be lineally descended from the kinds of 
weapons known to the Founders. 
In addition to the tripartite test, two further limiting principles 
would tend to exclude the sophisticated military technology of mass 
destruction - or, indeed, anything beyond ordinary small arms -
from the amendment's protection. First, since the text refers to arms 
that the individual can "keep and bear," weapons too heavy or bulky 
for the ordinary person to carry are apparently not contemplated. 
Second, according to Blackstone and Hawkins, the common-law 
right did not extend to "dangerous or unusual weapons" whose mere 
possession or exhibition "are apt to terrify the people."241 Naturally, 
it would terrify the citizenry for unauthorized individuals to possess 
weapons that could not realistically be used even in self-defense 
without endangering innocent people in adjacent areas or buildings. 
B. Laws Prohibiting the Urban Possession of Rflles, Shotguns and 
Highly Penetrative Handgun Bullets 
This last limiting principle might also allow legislation against 
keeping rifles and shotguns loaded for defense, at least in urban ar-
eas. Although it appears that most people who keep :firearms for 
self-defense today depend upon handguns, it is unfortunately the 
case that some urbanites continue to rely on long guns.242 While a 
rifle or shotgun is clearly more effective than a handgun if the sole 
consideration is instantly killing a burglar,243 the various potential 
241. 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149; 1 w. HAWKINS, supra note 153, at 136. 
Blackstone was discussing a statute that properly made the carrying of such weapons a crimi-
nal breach of the peace. Similarly, Hawkins approved the criminalization of "affray," an of-
fense that included the display of terrifying weapons. · 
242. See McClain, Firearms Ownership, Gun Control Attitudes and Neighborhood Environ-
ment, 5 LAW & POLICY Q. 299, 305-07 (1983). 
243. The superior deadliness of long guns is touted by the field director of the National 
Coalition to Ban Handguns among others. :i;>eriding the message behind NRA publicity of 
instances in which handgun-armed householders routed burglars, he recommends "a twelve 
gauge shotgun," for it will not only protect the householder better, but serve society as well by 
"permanently ending the intruder's crime career," - that is, a shotgun blast will kill him 
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side effects of firing such a weapon in an urban environment make it 
unacceptable. 
Consider penetration: even the .44 magnum, the most powerful 
of all handguns, penetrates no more than thirteen inches in wood, 
while revolvers in the far more commonly owned .32 to .38 calibers 
range from two to seven inches in penetration.244 In contrast, the 
relatively underpowered military surplus carbine with which Presi-, 
dent Kennedy was killed penetrates forty-seven inches.245 So a 
householder or shopkeeper who uses a rifle against a robber is im-
posing on others a very considerable risk that the bullet will pene-
trate all the way through the intended target and successive wood or 
stucco walls, entering the street or a neighboring building with 
enough remaining velocity to kill an innocent third party. While a 
shotgun's discharge does not have equivalent penetration because its 
velocity is far less, that velocity still substantially exceeds all but the 
most powerful handguns.246 Moreover, a householder or shopkeeper 
who elects to defend his premises with a riot gun's promiscuous 
spray may end up hitting one or more of his own innocent children 
or customers, along with the robber. In contrast, a handgun fires one 
bullet at a time which, if accurately aimed, is unlikely to pass 
through the robber, or, if it does so, will bury itself harmlessly in the 
wall. 
By the same token, accidental discharges with long guns (particu-
larly rifles, which can penetrate horizontally through successive 
houses on a city block or vertically through the floors and ceilings of 
successive apartments in a high rise) are much more dangerous than 
with handguns. This danger is multiplied by the fact that a rifle or 
shotgun kept loaded for home or store defense is much more likely 
to suffer accidental discharge than is a handgun. A rifle or shotgun 
instead of inflicting a nonfatal wound such as a handgun would be likely to do. Fields, Hand-
gun Prohibition and Social Necessity, 23 ST. LoUJS U. L.J. 3S, 41 (1979). A handgun wound 
will result in death S-10% of the time, while a comparable 12-gauge shotgun wound will result 
in death 80% or more of the time. See Kleck, Handgun-Only Gun Control· A Policy JJisaster in 
the Making, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note 10. 
244. D. GRENNELL & M. WILLIAMS, LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDGUN DIGEST 194-9S 
(1972); Steindler, Warning: Your Walls Are Not Bullet Proof in GUNS FOR HOME DEFENSE (G. 
James ed. 197S). 
24S. Lattimer & Lattimer, The Kennedy-Connally Single Bullet Theory, SO INTL. SURGERY 
524, 529 (1968). 
246. The more powerful military-caliber rifles which Americans generally favor exhibit 
muzzle velocities in the range of2500-3500 feet per second. A shotgun expels its projectiles at 
1300-1350 feet per second, a velocity level reached only by handguns in the .44 magnum and 
.357 magnum calibers. Most handguns generate velocities of less than 1000 feet per second. 
See D. GRENNELL & M. WILLIAMS, supra note 244, at 188; GUN DIGEST 2S7-68 (K. Warner 
ed. 1982). 
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kept ready to fire can discharge simply through impact if dropped on 
a floor; a modem revolver will not. A long gun is also much more 
difficult than a handgun to lock or hide away from inquisitive chil-
dren. Finally, if an inquisitive three-year-old does locate a loaded 
rifle or shotgun, pushing the safety to "off'' and pulling the trigger is 
literally "child's play''; he would not be strong enough to operate the 
trigger on a revolver or the slide on an automatic pistol.247 
These technical factors are reflected in the concrete form of fire-
arms accident statistics. Fifty years ago, long guns outnumbered 
handguns seven-to-one and were the principal weapons kept loaded 
in the home - handguns being possessed by less than one in thirteen 
Americans. In contrast, handguns today represent one-third of the 
total gunstock and one in every four American households contains 
them.248 Even though the handgun stock has grown to the point of 
displacing long guns in the home defense role, however, Americans 
continue to buy many more long guns (apparently for sport) each 
year than they do handguns. 249 Yet this enormous increase in all 
kinds of firearms has been accompanied by the decline of per capita 
accidental firearms fatalities to the lowest point since the compila-
tion of such statistics began.250 It is difficult not to attribute this de-
cline to the general change-over to handguns for home defense. 
Indicative of the dangers presented by the practice of keeping loaded 
long guns is the fact that, although handguns undoubtedly represent 
90% or more of the weapons kept loaded at any one time today, only 
15.5% of accidental firearms deaths appear to involve handguns.251 
Based on these statistics, an urban community (or a state legisla-
ture) might arguably rely on the "dangerous or unusual" weapon 
exclusion to prohibit the keeping ofloaded long guns within densely 
populated municipal areas. By parity of reasoning, cognate restric-
247. The author has confirmed this by actual experiment with children of this age. 
248. Compare Benenson, supra note 3, at 720 (quoting 1937 estimate by U.S. Attorney 
General Homer Cummings), with Kates, supra note 17, at n.2 (unpaginated manuscript), and 
WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 3, at ch. 2. 
249. The controversy surrounding the quadrupling of handgun sales over the past 20 years 
has tended to obscure the fact that long gun production has always exceeded that of handguns 
in the United States. For the seven years preceding 1980, for instance, long gun production 
outstripped handguns by 75%. Indicative of the phenomenal increase in long gun ownership is 
the fact that in that seven-year period more than one-third as many long guns were manufac-
tured as in the entire preceding 70-year period. Compare G. NEwrON & F. ZIMRlNG, supra 
note 13, at 172 (giving 1899-1968 statistics), with Production Figures of the American Firearms 
Industry 1973-1979, AM. FIREARMS !Nous. MAG., Dec. 1980, at 32. 
250. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, 1982 ACCIDENT FACTS 15 (indicating a 68% decline in 
the per capita rate of accidental firearms fatalities from 1913-1932, when it was 2.5 per hun-
dred thousand population, to 1978-81, when it was 0.8 per hundred thousand population). 
251. Private communication from National Safety Council (Mar. 28, 1983). This estimate 
is based on 1979 figures only, ,as no others are available. 
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tions might be placed on the kind of handguns which could be kept 
for self-defense or at least on kinds of ammunition. Such legislation 
might prohibit special high-penetration ammunition like the contro-
versial KTW bullet, magnum ammunition for magnum revolvers, or 
full metal-jacketed ammunition for high-powered automatic pistols. 
Alternatively or cumulatively, the legislature might affirmatively 
limit those possessing high-velocity handguns to ammunition spe-
cially designed for low penetration, such as hollow point and semi-
wadcutter. 
C. Licensing and Registration Requirements for Gun Ownership 
The terms gun "licensing" and "registration" are susceptible to 
multiple interpretations, although most people, including nonlegal 
scholars and opinion poll formulators, seem lamentably ignorant of 
this fact.252 Under the form known as discretionary or "restrictive" 
licensing, the applicant has no right to have a gun or to be issued a 
permit by the police even ff he meets all statutorily prescribed crite-
ria. His application may be denied simply because enough permits 
have already been issued to others, or because his reason for desiring 
a firearm is not deemed important or compelling enough.253 Such a 
discretionary or restrictive licensing system, which is the form advo-
cated by proponents of eliminating or radically reducing civilian gun 
ownership,254 is clearly inconsistent with the second amendment's 
guarantee of a personal right to possess arms. 
In sharp contrast to restrictive licensing are both "permissive" 
licensing and registration. Under a permissive licensing system the 
applicant is entitled to licensure as of right unless he falls into certain 
proscribed categories - e.g., juveniles, convicted felons and the 
252. See Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United Stales, in RE• 
STRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 6, at 27-28. 
253. See Kates,supra note 17, at n.l and accompanying text (unpaginated manuscript). In 
one jurisdiction, informally established administrative criteria automatically deny handgun-
purchase permits to homosexuals, nonvoters, women who lack their husband's permission, and 
anyone whom the sheriff personally dislikes. New York City permits have been denied on 
such bases as: post-nasal drip that caused the applicant to repeatedly clear his throat during 
the application interview demonstrated that he was ''too nervous" to be trusted with a hand-
gun; a son who "had been in trouble with the police," although the applicant himself had "a 
spotless record." Hardy & Chotiner,supra note 6, at 205, 209-11. In 1957, the New York City 
Police Department announced that henceforth applications would be entertained only from 
those desiring handguns to defend property. Reasons like target shooting or gun collecting, 
which did not contemplate the use of the gun against another human being, were not deemed 
important or compelling enough to warrant receiving an application form. Kates, supra note 
17, at n.l and accompanying text (unpaginated manuscript). 
254. See, e.g., G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, supra note 13, at 83 (coining the terms "restric-
tive" and ''permissive" licensing, and favoring the former). 
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mentally unbalanced.255 Registration, though often confused with li-
censing, literally means only that owners must identify themselves 
and their firearms to the police or some other designated author-
ity. 256 Registration is generally tied to an overall control system, 
however, which, like permissive licensing, proscribes handgun own-
ership by classes of persons, such as felons and juveniles, with a high 
potential for misuse.257 Neither registration nor permissive licensing 
are per se violative of the amendment since they operate only to 
exclude gun ownership by those upon whom the amendment confers 
no right.258 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that registration and permissive 
licensing cannot sustain scrutiny under the amendment, in that they 
undercut one of its most important purposes: deterring potential des-
pots by the prospect that, in a country with perhaps 160 million 
civilian firearms, even an initially successful coup would result in 
internecine civil or guerilla warfare.259 By destroying the anonymity 
of gun ownership, licensing or registration laws would make it possi-
ble for a despot to follow up his coup by confiscating all firearms. 
Whatever the abstract cogency of this argument, the concept of 
anonymity or privacy in gun ownership profoundly departs from the 
conditions under which the Founders envisioned the amendment op-
erating. Under the militia laws (first colonial, then state and eventu-
ally federal), every household, and/ or male reaching the age of 
majority, was required to maintain at least one firearm in good con-
dition. To prove compliance these firearms had to be submitted for 
inspection periodically.260 While the firearms-maintenance provi-
sions of state law and the First Militia Act have long since been re-
pealed, federal law continues to classify the entire able-bodied male 
citizenry aged seventeen to forty-five as "the militia of the United 
States."261 This being the country's ultimate military resource, men 
255. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-33 (1983) (handgun may be purchased only upon 
application, which is deemed granted unless within two weeks licensing authority rejects, 
based on finding of felony conviction); MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 140, § 129B (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1981) (every applicant "shall be entitled to" issuance of a firearms identification card al-
lowing purchase or possession of firearms unless he has been convicted of a felony within the 
last five years, is under treatment for drug addiction, or habitual drunkenness, has been an 
inmate of a psychiatric institution, or penetitiary, etc.). 
256. See Bruce-Briggs, supra note 9, at 42; Kaplan, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
251. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 12072, 12073 (Deering 1980). 
258. As to felons, see text accompanying notes 266-67 i'!fra. As to juveniles, suffice it to 
say that the militia laws specifically excluded those below the age of majority. See notes 46-48, 
54supra. 
259. See Caplan, supra note IO, at SI; notes 281-82 infra and accompanying text. 
260. See notes 46, 48-49 supra and accompanying text. 
261. 10 u.s.c. § 311 (1982). 
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in this group remain liable for muster in dire military emergencies, 
e.g., when necessary to keep order in the aftermath of an atomic 
attack or when both the Army and the National Guard have been 
deployed overseas.262 Since one can scarcely argue that the First Mi-
litia Act violated the amendment,263 it is difficult to see that it would 
be unconstitutional for Congress even today to require every mem-
ber of the present militia to possess a firearm and regularly present it 
for inspection to assure that it is being maintained in good working 
order. Alternatively, and fully consistent with these purposes, a na-
tional gun registration scheme could allow federal authorities to mo-
bilize selectively those members of the unorganized militia who are 
already armed and presumably familiar with the handling of weap-
ons. 264 In sum, the historical background of the second amendment 
seems inconsistent with any notion of anonymity or privacy insofar 
as the mere fact of one's possessing a firearm is concerned. 
D. Laws Prohibiting Firearms to Felons 
Current federal, and many state, laws prohibit the possession of 
firearms by anyone who has been convicted of a felony.265 Since a 
substantial majority of murderers appear to have prior felony 
records, it has recently been suggested that strong enforcement of 
such laws could effectively reduce homicidal violence. 266 The consti-
tutionality of such legislation cannot seriously be questioned on a 
theory that felons are included within "the people" whose right to 
arms is guaranteed by the second amendment. Felons simply did 
not fall within the benefits of the common law right to possess arms. 
That law punished felons with automatic forfeiture of all goods, usu-
ally accompanied by death. We may presume that persons confined 
in gaols awaiting trial on criminal charges were also debarred from 
the possession of arms. Nor does it seem that the Founders consid-
ered felons within the common law right to arms or intended to con-
fer any such right upon them. All the ratifying convention proposals 
which most explicitly detailed the recommended right-to-arms 
amendment excluded criminals and the violent.267 
262. See Sprecher, supra note 10, at 667. 
263. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. 
264. See note 193 supra and accompanying text as to the militia value of allowing individ-
ual ownership and home possession of firearms. 
265. See, e.g., 18 u.s.c. § 922(g), (h) (1982) (all firearms); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 
(Deering 1980 & Supp. 1983) (handguns). 
266. Kleck & Bordua, The Factual Foundation far Certain Key Assumptions of Gun Control, 
5 LAW & POLY. Q. 271, 291-94 (1983). 
267. See notes 70, 72 & 83 supra and accompanying text. 
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E. Laws Restricting the Right To Carry Arms Outside of the 
Owner's Own Premises 
267 
Largely as a result of gun-owner organizations' own legislative 
proposals, the laws of every state but Vermont prohibit at least the 
carrying of a concealed handgun off one's own premises.268 A com-
mon proposal, already the law in many jurisdictions, is to prohibit 
even the open carrying of handguns ( or all firearms), with limited 
exceptions for target shooting and the like, without a permit. 269 A 
further proposal would impose a mandatory roiniro,UID jail sentence 
for the unauthorized carrying of a handgun (or any :fl.rearm) off the 
owner's premises.210 
The constitutionality of such legislation under the amendment 
can be established on the same basis as the unconstitutionality of a 
ban on possession. Smith's research in seventeenth and eighteenth-
century colonial statutes indicates that, while the statutes used 
"keep" to refer to a person's having a gun in his home, they used 
"bear" only to refer to the bearing of arms while engaged in militia 
activities.271 Thus the amendment's language was apparently in-
tended to protect the possession of firearms for all legitimate pur-
poses, but to guarantee the right to carry them outside the home only 
in the course of militia service. Outside that context the only carry-
ing of firearms which the amendment appears to protect is such 
transportation as is implicit in the concept of a right to possess -
e.g., transporting them between the purchaser or owner's premises 
and a shooting range, or a gun store or gunsmith and so on. 
CONCLUSION 
The second amendment's language and historical and philosoph-
ical background demonstrate that it was designed to guarantee indi-
268. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (1974) (prohibition limited to carrying with intent 
to commit crime, or within a state institution or upon its grounds). As to the NRA's sponsor-
ship of the Uniform Revolver Act, from which such legislation largely derives, see note 23 
supra. 
269. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02(a) (Vernon 1974). 
270. Scholars continue to debate whether this legislation has any significant impact on the 
crime rate. Compare Deutsch & Alt, Tlte Effect of Massachusells' Gun Control Law on Gun-
Related Crimes in the City of Boston, I EVALUATION Q. 543 (1977), with Hay & McCleary, Box-
Tiao Time Series Models far Impact Assessment: A Comment on the Recent Work of .Deutsch 
and Alt, 3 EVALUATION Q. 277 (1979). For a general discussion of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the studies, see WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA,supra note 3, at 9-20. 
The latest and most negative assessment of the mandatory penalty device, a study done for the 
U.S. Department of Justice, is K. CARLSON, MANDATORY SENTENCING: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
Two STATES (1982). 
271. See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text. 
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viduals the possession of certain kinds of arms for three purposes: 
(1) crime prevention, or what we would today describe as individual 
self-defense; (2) national defense; and (3) preservation of individual 
liberty and popular institutions against domestic despotism. It is 
often suggested that each of these purposes is obsolete ~nd, there-
fore, that the amendment itself is obsolete. The national defense is 
fully provided for by our Armed Forces, supplemented by the Na-
tional Guard, and a citizenry possessing only small arms could 
neither deter nor overthrow a domestic military despotism possess-
ing tanks, aircraft and the other paraphernalia of modem war.272 
Likewise the possession of arms for self defense "is becoming anach-
ronistic. As the policing of society becomes more efficient, the need 
for arms for personal self-defense becomes more irrelevant . . . ."273 
Yet evidence can be offered to dispute each of these claims of 
obsolesence. As to the necessity of personal self-defense it is regret-
tably the case that enormous increases in police budgets and person-
nel have not prevented, for instance, the per capita incidence of 
reported robbery, rape and aggravated assault from increasing by 
300%, 400% and 300% respectively since 1960.274 Increasingly police 
are concluding, and even publicly proclaiming, that they cannot pro-
tect the law-abiding citizen, and that it is not only rational for him to 
choose to protect himself with :firearms,275 but a socially beneficial 
deterrent to violent crime.276 This is, of course, a highly controver-
272. See Clark, Reducing Firearms Availability: Constitutional Impediments lo Effective 
Legislation and an Agenda far Research, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note 10. 
273. Levin, supra note 13, at 166-67. 
274. Compare FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES • 1960, at 33, with FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIOATION, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES - 1980. See generally WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIO-
LENCE IN AMERICA, supra note 3. . 
275. See, e.g., Urban Merchants Find Guns Vital, And Most Police Units Now Agree, N.Y. 
Times, July 20, 1974, § 1, at 39, col. l; Kates, supra note 17, at n.14 and accompanying text 
(unpaginated manuscript) (collecting similar evidence): 
Of over 5,000 officers who responded to a 1977 poll, 64% felt that an armed citizenry 
deters crime, and 86% stated that, if they were private citizens, they would keep a firearm 
for self defense. • • . These results may be subject to C\uestion since the poll was done for 
an organization which lobbies against handgun prohibition legislation. But in 1976 police 
chiefs and high ranking administrators were polled nationwide by the Research Division 
of the Boston Police Department which was then headed by Robert DiGrazia, an outspo-
ken prol'onent of handgun prohibition. [The departmental survey reported]: "A substan-
tial maJority of the respondents looked favorably upon the general possession of 
handguns by the citizenry (excludes those with criminal records and a history of mental 
instability). Strong approval was also elicited from the police administrators concerning 
possession of handguns in the home or place of business." Indeed, by a bare majority, the 
respondents endorsed the idea that pnvate citizens should be allowed to actually carry 
firearms with them at all times for self-protection. In answer to another question, the 
respondents opined that officers lower ranking than themselves would be even less favora-
bly disposed toward "gun control." 
276. Fundamental to systematic discussion of these issues is the distinction between any 
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sial matter,277 though the more recent scholarship has tended to vin-
dicate the police point of view.278 For present purposes it is 
unnecessary to resolve this controversy. The mere fact of its exist-
self-defense value gun ownership may have and any potential crime deterrence value. For 
instance, G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, supra note 13, at 62-68, are unassailably correct in assert-
ing that a gun owner rarely has the opportunity to defend his home or business against burglars 
because they generally take pains to strike only at unoccupied premises. But this fails to ad-
dress two important issues of detellence. First, Kleck and Bordua calculate that a burglar's 
small chance of being confronted by a gun-armed defender probably exceeds that of his being 
apprehended, tried, convicted and actually serving any time. One would then ask which is a 
greater deterrent: a slim chance of being punished or a slim chance of being shot? See Kleck 
& Bordua, wpra note 266, at 282. Second, and even more important, fear of meeting a gun-
armed defender may be one factor in the care most burglars take to strike at only unoccupied 
premises. In this connection, remember that it is precisely because burglary is generally a non-
confrontation crime that victim injury or death is so very rarely associated with it - in con-
trast to robbery, where victim death is an all too frequent occurrence. If the deterrent effect of 
victim gun possession reduces victim death or injury by helping make burglary an overwhelm-
ingly nonconfrontation crime, that detellent benefits burglary victims and society in general, 
even though the defense value to the gun owners themselves is negligible. 
Polls of convicted felons suggest that the average criminal has no more desire to meet an 
armed citizen than the average citizen has to meet an armed criminal: 
Surveys among prison populations uniformly find felons stating that, whenever possible, 
they avoid victims who are thought to be armed, and that they know of planned crimes 
that were abandoned when it was discovered that the prospective victim was armed. In-
deed, in these surveys prison denizens expressed support for handgun prohibition on [the 
grounds] ..• that it would make life safer and easier for the criminal by disarming his 
victims without affecting his own ability to attack them. Typical of prisoner comments, 
according to criminologist Ernest van den Haag of New York University, was: "Ban 
guns; I'd love it. I'm an armed robber." 
Silver & Kates, Se{f-Defense, Handgun Ownership, and the Independence of Women in a Violent, 
Sexist Society, in REsTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 6, at 139, 151 (footnote omitted). 
These conclusions are confirmed by the largest such survey yet conducted. The as-yet-unpub-
lished results of this study in ten major prisons across the nation by the Social and Demo-
graphic Institute of the University of Massachusetts, are set out in its director's letter of May 
10, 1983, to the author [hereinafter cited as Prison Survey]. 
277. See, e.g., G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING,supra note 13, at 61-68; M. YEAGER, J. ALVIANI 
& N. LOVING, How WELL DOES THE HANDGUN PROTECT You AND YOUR FAMILY? (1976); 
Rushforth, Hirsch, Ford & Adelson, Accidental Firearm Fatalities in a Metropolitan County 
(1958-1973), 100 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 499 (1975). The Rushforth study is the source of the 
well-known statistic that a handgun held by a homeowner is six times more likely accidentally 
to kill a relative or acquaintance of the homeowner than to kill a burglar. It and the Yeager 
study are assailed as partisan and unreliable by Wright, who concludes that the six-to-one 
figure is arrived at through statistical legerdemain. Wright, The Ownership of Firearms far 
Reasons of Se{f-Defense, (paper delivered to the 1981 annual meeting of the American Society 
of Criminology), reprinted in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, wpra note 10; see also Kleck & Bordua, 
supra note 266, at 281 (criticizes the Yeager study); Silver & Kates, supra note 276, at 152-56 
(discusses the efficacy of citizens keeping guns for self-defense purposes). 
278. G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, supra note 13, at 61-68, conclude from the fact that 
householders in Detroit and Los Angeles killed few burglars in the mid-1960's, that gun own-
ers rarely have the opportunity to foil criminal misconduct. The opposite is suggested by later 
figures from broader geographic areas and encompassing a fuller range of violent and con-
frontational felonies. Nationwide, 1981 FBI statistics show that citizens justifiably kill 30% 
more criminals than do police. In California, 1981 statistics show citizens justifiably killing 
twice as many felons as do the police; in Chicago and Cleveland it is three times as many. See 
Kleck & Bordua, supra note 266, at 290; Rushforth, Ford, Hirsch, Rushforth & Adelson, Vio-
lent Deaths in a Metropolitan County- Changing Pal/ems in Homicide (1958-1974), 291 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 531 (1977); Silver & Kates,supra note 276, at 156; Kates, Can We Deny Citizens 
Both Guns and Protection?, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1983, at 22, col. 6. Similar statistics for Hous-
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ence demonstrates that the asserted irrelevancy of self-defense today 
has not been so clearly proved as to justify the abandonment of an 
expressly guaranteed constitutional right. 
The argument that an armed citizenry cannot hope to overthrow 
a modem military machine flies directly in the face of the history of 
partisan guerilla and civil wars in the twentieth century. To make 
this argument (which is invariably supported, if at all, by reference 
only to theAmerican military experience in non-revolutionary strug-
gles like the two World Wars279), one must indulge in the assump-
tion that a handgun-armed citizenry will eschew guerrilla tactics in 
favor of throwing themselves headlong under the tracks of advanc-
ing tanks. Far from proving invincible, in the vast majority of cases 
in this century in which they have confronted popular insurgencies, 
modem armies have been unable to suppress the insurgents. This is 
why the British no longer rule in Israel and Ireland, the French in 
Indo-China, Algeria and Madagascar, the Portugese in Angola, the 
whites in Rhodesia, or General Somoza, General Battista, or the 
Shah in Nicaragua, Cuba and Iran respectively - not to mention 
the examples of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan.280 It is, of course, quite irrelevant for present pur-
poses whether each of the struggles just mentioned is or was justified 
or whether the people benefited therefrom. However one may ap-
praise those victories, the fact remains that they were achieved 
against regimes equipped with all the military technology which, it is 
asserted, inevitably dooms popular revolt. 
Perhaps more important, in a free country like our own, the issue 
is not really overthrowing a tyranny but deterring its institution in the 
first place. To persuade his officers and men to support a coup, a 
potential military despot must convince them that his rule will sue-
ton-Dallas are reported in Citizens' Gun Use on Rise in Houston, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1982, 
§ 1, at 27, col. 1. 
Moreover, justifiable homicide statistics provide an inherently distorted, under-representa-
tive picture of the value of civilian gun ownership. By analogy, the value of the police is not 
measured simply by how many criminals they kill, but rather by the entire universe of criminal 
activity deterred, as well as those criminals they wound, apprehend or scare off. Considering 
evidence on the entire universe of defensive handgun uses, Wright concludes that they are 
used at least as frequently in defense against criminals as they are by criminals in attacking 
citizens. See Wright, supra note 277. This conclusion is buttressed in Prison Survey, supra 
note 276, which reports that about 50% of the felons questioned (and a much higher proportion 
of the violent felons) stated that they had been interrupted, wounded, arrested or scared off by 
an armed citizen. 
219. See, e.g., DeZee, National Rf/le Association and Gun Control, in BUSINESS LOBBYING 
AND SOCIAL GOALS 212 (1979). 
280. See Marina, Weapons, Technology and Legitimacy: The Second .Amendment in Global 
Perspective, in FIREARMS & VIOLENCE, supra note 10; Kessler, Gun Control and Political 
Power, 5 LAW & POLY. Q. 381 (1983). 
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ceed where our current civilian leadership and policies are failing. 
In a country whose widely divergent citizenry possesses upwards of 
160 million firearms, however, the most likely outcome of usurpation 
(no matter how initially successful) is not benevolent dictatorship, 
but prolonged, internecine civil war: 
A general may have pipe dreams of a sudden and peaceful take-over 
and a nation moving confidently forward, united under his direction. 
But the realistic general will remember the actual fruits of civil war -
shattered cities like Hue, Beirut, and Belfast, devastated countrysides 
like the Mekong Delta, Cyprus, and southern Lebanon.281 
Even if the general's ambition does not recoil from the prospect of 
victory at such cost, will his officers and men accept it? Additionally, 
he and they must evaluate the effect of civil war in leaving the coun-
try vulnerable to the very foreign enemies their coup is designed to 
unite it against: 
Because it leads any prospective dictator to think through such 
questions, the individual, anonymous ownership of :firearms is still a 
deterrent today to the despotism it was originally intended to obviate. 
Implicit in the Bill of Rights, as in the entire structure of our Con-
stitution, are the twin hallmarks of traditional liberal thought: trust in 
the people, and distrust in government, particularly the military and 
the police. We are apt to forget these constant principles in light of our 
government's generally quite good record of exerting power without 
abusing it. But the deterrent effect of an armed citizenry is one little-
recognized factor that may have contributed to this. In the words of 
the late Senator Hubert Humphrey, "[t]he right of citizens to bear arms 
is just one more guarantee against arbitrary government, one more 
safeguard against the tyranny which now appears remote in America, 
but which historically has proved to be always possible."282 
Moving to the argument that a militia is not necessary to the na-
tional defense, for constitutional purposes the issue appears· to have 
been resolved by Congress. For Congress has determined that it re-
mains necessary to classify the entire able-bodied male population 
aged seventeen to forty-five as the militia of the United States, sub-
ject to a potential call to arms in the case of dire military emer-
gency.283 Moreover, the recent military history of the United States 
281. Hardy, The Second Amendment as a Restraint on State and Federal Firearm Restric-
tions, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note 6, at 171, 184. 
282. Id. at 184-85. 
283. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1982). Sprecher, supra note 10, at 667, notes that the unorganized 
militia constitutes the only available substitute for national defense purposes in circumstances, 
like those of World War II, in which both the Army and the federalized National Guard have 
been deployed overseas. Recognizing that the unorganized militia can "not prevent an atomic 
attack," its mobilization may nevertheless be necessary to "preserve internal order after one." 
''Thus militias (by whatever name) are as important as ever, and perhaps more so in the atom-
and-missile age . . . ." 
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shows that such militia units are still being called upon in time of 
military emergency.2s4 
Finally, arguments as to whether the amendment is obsolete are 
of at most tangential import to its proper interpretation by the 
courts. After all, the second amendment is not the only provision of 
the Bill of Rights which is assertedly obsolete ( or with the idea of 
which some Americans may today just happen to disagree). For in-
stance, a judge may be absolutely convinced by scientific argument 
that the premise of free will which underlies freedom of religion has 
been invalidated by the modem psychological concept of brain-
washing. He may believe a mother's anguished claims that only by 
such insidious techniques could her son have been induced by a 
"cult" to drop out of college and abandon the beliefs and lifestyle to 
which she raised him. Nevertheless, so long as the first amendment 
stands, no judge is free to disregard as obsolete the rights it confers 
on that young man and commit him to the custody of a "deprogram-
mer."285 The seventh amendment, to take another example, clearly 
is obsolete, at least insofar as it requires jury trials in civil cases ex-
ceeding twenty dollars in controversy. Nevertheless, the courts con-
tinue faithfully to apply that amendment's dictate in all cases fairly 
covered by its literal wording and original spirit.286 Though courts 
sometimes give constitutional rights additional scope in order to ef-
fectuate what is deemed to be their original intent, courts have no 
authority to reduce or eliminate the plain terms of a constitutional 
guarantee because they disagree with that intent or view it as obso-
lete.287 The duty of the courts is to enforce the Constitution, not to 
284. As late as Pearl Harbor, a military emergency was deemed to require mustering indi-
vidually armed citizens. Because available military personnel were insufficient to repel the 
Japanese invasion that seemed imminent, the Governor of Hawaii called upon citizens to use 
their personal arms in manning checkpoints and remote beach areas. (Ironically, many of 
those who responded were Japanese-Americans whose colleagues in California were soon to 
be imprisoned without benefit of trial or habeas corpus.) Across the country the unorganized 
militia proved a successful substitute for the National Guard, which was federalized and acti-
vated for overseas duty. OFFICE OF THE AsSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPT. OF 
DEFENSE, U.S. HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY, 32, 34 (1981). Members of the unorganized 
militia, many of whom belonged to gun clubs and whose ages ranged from 16 to 65, served 
without pay and provided their own arms. Id at 58, 62-63. The U.S. government, however, 
not only could not supply sufficient arms to the militia but "turned out to be an Indian giver" 
by recalling rifles. M. SCHLEGEL, VIRGINIA ON GUARD 131 (1949). 
285. See, e.g., Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 
(1981). 
286. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (applying seventh amendment to 
damage actions for housing discrimination under the 1968 Civil Rights Act); Pernell v. 
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (applying seventh amendment to actions under special 
District of Columbia statute). 
287. See, e.g., State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 360, 614 P.2d 94, 95 (1980): 
We are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the wisdom of a right to bear 
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arrogate to themselves the power to delete its provisions.288 Gener-
ally speaking, the power to withdraw a right explicitly guaranteed to 
the people is reserved exclusively to their state and federal legisla-
tures in a process which is ornately hedged with safeguards, not the 
least of which is its protracted length.289 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
noted in reference to criticism of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as an obstacle to the needs of law enforcement in an era of ram-
pant crime: "If it be thought that the privilege is outmoded in the 
conditions of this modem age, then the thing to do is to take it out of 
the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the subtle encroachments 
of judicial opinion."290 
Unmistakably the Founders intended the second amendment to 
guarantee an individual right to possess certain kinds of weapons in 
the home certain kinds of circumstances. The precise details and 
parameters of that guarantee remain significantly unclear. In part 
this is because neither federal, state nor local governments have gen-
erally moved beyond gun control to the extreme of confiscation. In 
even larger part the delay in defining its parameters is attributable to 
the diversion and monopolization of legal analysis by the false di-
chotomy between the exclusively state's right and the unrestricted 
individual right interpretations. In fact, the arms of the state's mili-
tias were and are the personally owned arms of the general citizenry, 
so that the amendment's dual intention to protect both was achieved 
by guaranteeing to the citizenry a right to possess arms individually. 
Having dispelled the ahistorical exclusively state's right notion, it 
will become possible to move forward to analyzing how rational, ef-
fectual gun control strategies can be reconciled with the constitu-
tional scheme. 
arms, and that the original motivations for such a provision might not seem compelling if 
debated as a new issue. Our task, however, in construing a constitutional provision is to 
respect the principles given the status of constitutional guarantees and limitations by the 
drafters; it is not to abandon these principles when this fits the needs of the moment. 
Cf. note 28 supra (discussing the proper role of original intent in constitutional adjudication). 
288. Hamilton's explanation of the judicial function in THE FEDERALIST No. 78 remains 
as true today as it was when he penned it: 
[T]he right of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void . . . [does not) by any means 
suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the 
power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature declared 
in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the 
judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 577-78 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1864). 
289. We are reminded by Mr. Justice Douglas of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's dictum that 
"it would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for 
which the words of [the Constitution] expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation." 
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 77 (1946). 
290. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1956) (qucting Mafiie v. United 
States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)). 
